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ORAL ARGUMENTS

In the Matter of: Distribution of 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997 Cable Royalty Funds Docket No. 2000-2 CARP CD 93-97

Monday, December 11, 2000

The oral arguments took place at 3:00 p.m., in Room 414 of the Library of Congress' Madison Building, 101 Independence Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20559.

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE DOROTHY K. CAMPBELL, Chairperson

THE HONORABLE JOHN W. COOLEY

THE HONORABLE MARK J. DAVIS

NEAL R. GROSS

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Also Present:

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C-O-N-T-E-N-T-S

Oral argument of Michael E. Tucci, Esq.		
on behalf of the Program Suppliers	•	. 6
Oral argument of Arnold P. Lutzker, Esq.		
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on behalf of the Program Suppliers	•	T0.
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Group		111

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JUDGE CAMPBELL: We welcome you, Gary, helping us today. We appreciate both sides getting together and giving us enough paper to start the Russian War.

First, we have some preliminary matters. One is -- and Gary, make sure you get this down, the hearing was to have started this morning and by agreement of the parties we did reschedule it to 3 o'clock.

In addition to that, I would like to say that I hope we can continue the spirit of cooperation that was evidenced by the scheduling hearing. charge each one present to remember that the trust invested in you by the claimants you represent is something to bear in mind at all times while you're here. Do not, in moments of passion, with regard to the points that you are presenting, overlook the best interest of the claimants. They are the ones who have engaged you to serve here today.

Also, I urge you to realize that the final

outcome of these proceedings will be a reality for 1 your clients with respect to the 1997 proceeds and 2 3 quite possibly regarding claims in the future. I caution you, as you map the future path 4 5 regarding these royalty issues at hand to bear that in 6 mind. 7 We expect full respect and professional 8 decorum throughout these proceedings and I know we will get it. It was graciously evident during the 9 prior hearing and I appreciate that and so does the 10 11 rest of the Panel. 12 Our time is limited and precious. It is therefore critical that all persons involved stay 13 focused on the issues and don't get lost in your 14 15 passions. 16 We are going to take a break somewhere between 4:15 and 4:45 unless all here feel that we can 17 18 charge forth and spend a little more time dealing with Sometimes those breaks are critical to 19 the issues. 20 allow you to think away from the moment and get back to the point at hand. 21

If the parties wish to have additional

moments for private discussions, please let us know and that might be iust among vourselves as representatives or with your clients, depending on what you feel is necessary at the time. Do this so in an appropriate manner and we do not expect to endure on anybody's behalf unnecessary interruptions during any testimony today or at any other time. Remember, please, the time frame is very tight. We have 180 days and many of those days have already passed.

And please, remember, that all parties here deserve a full and fair opportunity to be heard and it is our charge to allow that to happen.

If you will look at your scheduling outline the first item for oral testimony today is the Motion to Reconsider. Unless there are preliminary items by the parties -- that motion was made by the MPAA.

MR. TUCCI: Thank you. As a preliminary matter, I know we have three hours allotted today. If it's close and we have tomorrow as well. If it's close, to be completed today, we're perfectly willing to stay and get this completed today in order to give

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you all the time tomorrow to decide these matters. I just wanted to state that for the record.

I'm Michael Tucci on behalf of the Programs Suppliers. With me is Greg Olaniran and Jim Popham who is the Vice President of MPAA and who has also entered an appearance in this matter.

This is our motion. It's our motion, renewed motion to dismiss and a motion to reconsider this Panel's order of November 15th, 2000.

Before I delve straight into it, I think it's very important to understand the context in which bring this motion. We filed this motion originally, filed the motion to dismiss in May of 2000. After we realized that none of the parties who are identified as Exhibit D claimants on the direct testimony of IPG are actual claimants in this proceeding. None of them filed claims. It's also apparent and I think undisputed in the record that WSG/IPG is not an actual claimant or not a bona fide claimant as well, being not an owner or a distributor of a copyrightable program.

When we filed it, we received an order

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from the Copyright Office which I think acknowledges the lack of validity of the IPG/WSG claim, but gain IP and WSG an opportunity to fit into an exception practice, specifically for this case.

What's important -- and we disagree with the exception, let me state that for the record. And I'll get more to that in the future in just a minute, but the important thing, I think for purposes of this motion today is to understand that the criteria that the Copyright Office placed on IPG with respect to complying with this special IPG exception and the criteria which is outlined on page 7 of the June 22nd order was number one that IPG has the burden of proof on the issue of representation.

And the second thing is the manner of proof, the items of proof that the Copyright Office felt were appropriate in order to prove representation. And those items are clearly set forth in the order. Just a quote from the order, it says "proof must be in the form of written agreements and representation between IPG and each of the Exhibit D parties executed on or before July 31, 1998." What is

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very important to remember is it's written agreements and they must be executed before July 31, 1998 and IPG has the burden of proof on that issue.

After receipt of this order, because viewing the representation agreements and the other discovery items that IPG had provided to the Program Suppliers, we could tell that they could not comply with the burden established by the Copyright Office, we move for additional discovery because anticipated and I might add correctly so, that IPG would attempt to introduce other documents in order to prove representation agreements that fit within the criteria established by the Copyright Office.

That motion was dismissed without prejudice because in their response IPG said we're not going to produce anything new. What you see is what you get. We think that we have established representation within the criteria based on the record before the items that have been produced in discovery.

What could we do but just go on. So that's what we did. But about a month after that, I think IPG realized the error of their ways and they

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filed a motion to amend the June 22nd order of the Copyright Office. That motion said well, we shouldn't be restricted to the items of proof that you have restricted us to.

should be allowed forth to put correspondence, memoranda, affidavits, oral testimony and again, very importantly, while we don't agree with the exception created, the criteria established in the Copyright Office's order of September 22nd gave them a bit of leeway, but it basically dismissed out of hand the notion that unwritten agreements, after the fact documents, correspondence in those matters, could be used to prove representation. It reiterated the notion that representation had to be in the form of written agreements, that IPG had the burden of proof of that representation and that the documents proving that representation had to exist prior to July 31, 1998.

A series of conference calls occurred after that and IPG came forward with what we called, and I think in our papers we called the October 10th documents.

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The October 10th documents are at, as I understand it, in IPG's view an attempt to comply with the Copyright Office's written criteria. Just so the Panel is aware, we filed last week a renewed motion for additional discovery. That's basically a renewal of the motion that I talked about that was dismissed by the Copyright Office.

The reason we did that is because we fully believe there are additional documents that are relevant to the issue of the representation look at agreements. Ι£ you the October documents, in every instance the argument is made is that they tend to prove representation within the time frame required by the Copyright Office.

It's our belief that there are additional documents which would probably tend to disprove that. None of those have been produced. We're entitled to those documents. To the extent that these claims go forward, we are entitled to those documents. I just want to bring that to the Panel's attention. If that's out there, it's an additional motion. We can argue it today or we can save it for another day.

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1	Now, as I stated, we disagree with the
2	special IPG exception to the statutory requirements.
3	One thing though that is clear is that this can be
4	decided on the basis of the papers that are before
5	you. The Copyright Office has specifically excluded
6	oral testimony. And there's no testimony that can be
7	taken on these particular issues. You need to look at
8	the documents.
9	You need to look at what has been
10	presented and make a determination. We believe once
11	you make that determination, once you do that review
12	you will see that IPG cannot, with the matters that
13	are before you, make your burden of proof.
1.4	JUDGE COOLEY: Quick question and then you
15	can go on. But does that also relate to your
16	representation agreements?
17	MR. TUCCI: We're in vastly different
18	situations.
19	JUDGE COOLEY: All right.
20	MR. TUCCI: I'm glad you asked that
21	question.
22	JUDGE COOLEY: Fine. We can argue it

later, if you want in connection with another motion. 1 MR. TUCCI: And I will do that, but just 2 3 to briefly answer the question, we filed the claims. There is no reason for there to be a Copyright Office 4 5 exception with respect to the Program Suppliers. are 112 claimants with numbers that have been stamped 6 7 on them by the Copyright Office. We have no claimants over here. 8 9 JUDGE COOLEY: All right. I just wanted to get that clear. You can go on. 10 MR. TUCCI: Now again, the hearing will 11 12 add nothing. There is no reason to have oral 13 testimony. There is no reason to have written 14 testimony. All of that has been specifically excluded by the Copyright Office. 15 16 The other point that I would like to make 17 and one of the points that we make in our papers as 18 well is that you have been charged with the decision 19 of whether these are valid claims by way of our motion to dismiss and whether the Exhibit D parties then IPG 20 established 21 have their burden of proving 22 representation under the Copyright Office's criteria.

And just to note for the record, in the same order, the June 22nd order that the Copyright Office created the IPG exception in, in another part of the order they said that the timely submission of a claim is a statutory requirement. We lacked authority to waive that requirement. But that's precisely what they did in creating the IPG exception. They created this exception which in effect waives the statutory requirement.

The statute is extremely clear. The statute requires that in order to participate in the 1997 royalty proceeding that the claimants file a claim within the time period prescribed by law which here was July 31, 1998. No claim, no valid claim was filed on behalf of any of the Exhibit D parties. The Copyright Office so found.

The other thing that I think is important that we cannot lose sight of us is the statute also creates a mechanism for payment of royalties and it says that the payment of royalties shall be to claimants who have filed.

So even if you accept the IPG special

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exception created by the Copyright Office, if you render a ruling that says they get X dollars, I don't think the Copyright Office can pay it because the says they're claimants. They're statute not It's totally undisputed that they're not claimants. Claimants -- I don't know -- it's not a defined term in the statute, but we certainly know what a claimant is. A claimant is somebody who files a claim with the Copyright Office with a stamp on and it's filed within a particular time.

Now getting to the exception itself, we have the requirement of written proof, oral testimony doesn't work. We have the requirement that it's clear and unambiquous that there is a written representation agreement prior to July 31, 1998 and the document had to exist. When viewing each of these representation agreements in the documents surrounding them you need specific t.o ask question, what document one establishes that this agreement was executed prior to August 1998 and I submit for every one of those representation agreements there is not a document which you could answer the question affirmatively that

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it existed prior to August of 1998.

Now in our papers we go through each one of these, mostly in our reply that was filed last week. In response to WSG and IPG's castigation that we hadn't identified all of the deficiencies, we go ahead and identify all of the deficiencies and I'm prepared to do that for each and every one, but I probably thing it's more appropriate use of time just to give you some examples.

But before I do that it is extremely important to recall the burden that is placed on IPG. It's no you all guessing whether this representation agreement was executed prior to a particular point in time. It's not you surmising it. You have to see a piece of evidence that says this document existed prior to August 1998. If you cannot find that piece of evidence they fail to sustain their burden and you must dismiss the claim.

Now as I said I have some examples and these are the documents that are the October 10th documents. The representation agreements with the October 10th documents and I just want to go through

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a couple of them. I have copies for everybody. If everybody would like to see the documents together, but we talked in our papers about the presumption that was created by the use of this "as-of" language and I think it's actually correct statement of law that the use of the "as-of" language in these representation agreements leaves you with no other conclusion than it was -- that it was executed at some time other than this "as-of" date. I think that's a legal presumption that you can make clearly.

That presumption is in this case conclusively proven by two facts. One, every representation agreement that has an execution date on it has a date that's different than the "as-of" date. Every October 20th document that And it's later. relates to the execution of the agreement conclusively establishes that the document was executed after the "as-of" date. For example, the Tide Group is the first one. The Tide Group has a representation agreement that's dated --

JUDGE CAMPBELL: I have one question.

MR. TUCCI: Yes.

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JUDGE CAMPBELL: Do you need copies of 1 what he has? 2 3 MR. TUCCI: I have copies. JUDGE CAMPBELL: You had copies. I just 4 5 want to make sure everybody got a copy. I think you 6 need to present everybody a copy so that we can get it 7 in the record. MR. TUCCI: Sure. 8 9 (Pause.) want to burden you with a 10 don't tremendous amount of paper, but as I stated just by 11 12 ο£ example, the Tide way an we have Group 13 representation agreement which is the first document 14 and it's dated as of June 30, 1998. 15 In the October 10th document which -- I 16 think it's pretty much towards the back. I'll find 17 exactly where it is. 18 (Pause.) 19 We have a July 8, 1998 letter which is about -- I'm sorry there's not any tabs in here. 20 I 21 think it's seven pages from the back. And it says --22 it's dated July 8, 1998, as I said. "Per our

conversation this morning, attached is a revised version of the agreement previously forwarded to you."

Obviously, the agreement was not in existence on the date -- the "as-of" date. But at some time thereafter.

But the problem is there's no evidence in front of you for you to make the determination as to when the agreement was executed. Because of that lack of evidence there is a failure in the burden of proof, specifically, a failure in the burden of production to produce evidence conforming to the criteria of the Copyright Office to establish the fact of representation. Without that you can't find that this is a valid -- that this validly meets the exception.

The second example, and I'm not going to go through everyone unless you would like me to go through every one, but I'm happy to. I think three will do it.

The Golden Films is dated -- the representation agreement is dated as of June 20, 1998.

Again, I didn't pick out these examples in any sort of

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order, but then again we have a letter in the October 10th documents dated -- it's actually a fax cover sheet, dated June 22, 1998. It is the first of the October 10th documents saying "pursuant to your fax of June 19th attached will you please find red line and execution copies between the parties. If it meets with your approval, please have two copies of representation agreement signed by the appropriate authorized signatories." There is no evidence in the record that this agreement was ever signed or that it was signed prior to July 31, 1998. Without that evidence, you cannot find that IPG satisfied the burden placed on it by the Copyright Office.

Another example is the United Negro College Fund. We have a representation agreement dated as of July 30, 1998. We have a letter in October 10th documents dated November 1998, the first October 10th document. It says "per your request, enclosed please find four originals of the agreement partially executed by Worldwide Subsidy Group."

Obviously, the agreement was not executed.

We also have a letter on letterhead of

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Worldwide Subsidy Group which is about documents, seven pages from the back dated July 30, 1998 from Worldwide Subsidy Group to Mr. Allen of the United Negro College Fund. And it does have a signature of somebody from the United Negro College Fund, but again, there's absolutely no evidence before you that this document was sent prior to August 1998, that it was received by UNCF prior to August 1998 or most importantly, that it was signed by them prior to Without that evidence, IPG fails to August 1998. sustain its burden.

Those are three examples. Each one of the documents or group of documents that comprise the October 10th documents for each of the representation agreements has similar failings and we point all of them out in our papers. And like I said, I'd be happy to go through each one, but I think the record will establish those facts.

Now, there's a very important group that's a little bit different and that group is the group of representation agreements that don't have October 10th documents. Again, we think they probably exist and

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we're trying to get them through our motion, but none have been produced up to this point. But you have to ask yourself the question with respect to those agreements is what evidence do you have in front of you that establishes when those agreements were executed. You have nothing, zero. You have an "as-of" date. We've established through the pattern, practice and presumption that the "as-of" date is not the execution date. And therefore, again, with respect to all of those agreements, they have failed in their burden.

Now finally, with respect to our motion to dismiss we set forth additional factual issues. I'm not going to argue each of those factual issues in detail. I'd be happy to answer any questions that the Panel has with respect to those issues, but I think that those are adequately outlined in our brief as well.

There's the issue of the representation, just for example, of Mr. Lacy because the Lacy folks actually were claimants, but we have a difference of opinion as to who represents them, those types of

factual disputes. 1 2 JUDGE CAMPBELL: On the Lacy, for our education here, is MPAA claiming Lacy as being 3 4 represented under the MPAA as part of their joint claim? 5 MR. TUCCI: Yes. MPAA does not have a 6 7 joint claim. We represent claimants that have filed 8 their own claim. JUDGE CAMPBELL: Okay. 9 10 TUCCI: There's a big difference. 11 Yes, and Lacy --CAMPBELL: 12 JUDGE Because Lacy is separately filed valid claim. 13 Our order just 14 indicated they weren't under the joint claim. 15 MR. TUCCI: And we think that's right. 16 They are a separate and valid claimant in these 17 proceedings. The question is who represents them. 18 And our original motion to dismiss we actually 19 attached a letter from Mr. Lacy saying MPAA represents 20 I have engaged WSG/IPG to engage us in a us. 21 collection of international royalties, not domestic

So that's the kind of factual issue that

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royalties.

I'm alluding to that we have discussed with respect to
I think three or four or five, maybe even, of the
claimants regarding, that are claimed by IPG.

Finally, we think when you look at the criteria that's established, well, let me even back up. The first thing that you need to do is determine whether you agree with the creation of the IPG exception in the first instance. We believe that when you read the statute you look at the Library's order, you will come to the conclusion, as a matter of fact, the conclusion that you can come to is that they have no authority to create this exception and without authority to create the exception, the claims must be dismissed outright.

But even if you have a question with respect to their authority to create this exception, none of the Exhibit D parties comply with the exception. IPG can't comply with the exception with respect to the Exhibit D parties and therefore independently the claims must be dismissed.

If you have any questions I'd be happy to

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1	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Mr. Tucci, I have one
2	more question similar to Lacy with its claim. Litton
3	Syndications. Is that a claim that MPAA feels is in
4	its representation pool? You didn't address that.
5	MR. TUCCI: No, we don't.
6	JUDGE CAMPBELL: All right.
7	MR. TUCCI: I've had clarification.
8	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Because there were some
9	questions about programs that were Litton programs on
10	the exhibit 3 to MPAA's direct case.
11	MR. TUCCI: We may, just to be absolutely
12	clear, we may have a situation where one of our
13	represented claimants claims an entitlement to
14	royalties for programs that appear on the Litton
15	program list. We do not claim that we represent
16	Litton as a member of the Program Suppliers.
17	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Yes. We realize that
18	that's easy because of distribution agreements to
19	happen, but we wanted that clarified.
20	MR. TUCCI: Right, and I think that there
21	is a situation where a couple of is it the Sabin
22	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Actually, there are I

found items -- on Exhibit D of IPG, programs number 1 22, 25, 16, 17, 18 and 24 were Litton programs at 2 3 issue on both sides, had been listed on both sides. So Shaka Zulu and Story of the People you raised in 4 yours, but then I found several others too. 5 6 MR. TUCCI: It may be a timing issue there 7 as you're well aware. There may be a 1996 and 1997 -there may be different distributors for different 8 9 years and that's why we have an overlap problem. 10 JUDGE CAMPBELL: Okay, I just wanted to 11 get that clarified. 12 MR. TUCCI: We have not included, before I say something incorrect, I think that at least two 13 of those, I think it's the two that you mentioned, we 14 15 did include in our motion to dismiss as a factual 16 matter as to who represented or who claimed entitlement to the royalties for those particular 17 18 programs. 19 MR. OLANIRAN: I think if Ι 20 correctly, that we probably pointed out was deficiency in the assertion that WSG actually claims 21 22 of that title, something to that effect. Would it not

directly address the issue of any title that may or 1 may not be in dispute between one of our claimants and 2 one of their claimants. 3 JUDGE CAMPBELL: As we look, as we move 4 5 further beyond this threshold issue and look look at the different 6 programs and methods 7 calculating royalties, that's something for both of you to take a look at. 8 It might be something that 9 easily you can decide that there's a way to resolve 10 this without any difficulty and with distribution agreements guite often that is the case. 11 12 So there may be some stipulations when we 13 get there, but I would just urge you to just take a 14 look at that issue so that everybody's working off the 15 same set of facts. It will make this a much more 16 speedy process when it comes to looking at the final 17 outcome which is the ultimate essence of this case. 18 MR. TUCCI: Thank you. 19 JUDGE CAMPBELL: Thank you. 20 JUDGE DAVIS: I just have one brief In your brief you discuss the Copyright 21 question.

Office creating the one time exception for IPG and you

stated that the Library acted arbitrarily and exceeded the bounds of its authority as a federal agency.

I'd like you to speak for a moment as to what possible jurisdiction this Panel has to address that issue.

MR. TUCCI: The jurisdiction that you have in our view is the jurisdiction to make an independent determination about the validity of the claim and about the factual, whether IPG has factually fit into the exception.

I don't think that we're in a situation where as IPG has characterized it where this Panel is reviewing the decision of the Library or the Copyright Office. It's a situation where you are taking a fresh look. You're making your own determination whether this is a bona fide and valid claim and if they disagree, they disagree. You will then send that decision to the Copyright Office for determination and make a well-reasoned decision that you know we have taken a look at this and we have made a determination that it's somewhat at odds with yours based on a wealth of more information as well. You have a lot

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more in front of you than they have. I mean we have 7 exchanged more documents. You've had much more 2 argument and certainly, you can come to a different 3 4 conclusion than they have. 5 I don't know that there's anything that jurisdictionally prohibits you from doing that and I 6 7 think that's probably the way I would look at it. 8 JUDGE DAVIS: Okay, thank you. 9 Mr. Lutzker, are you JUDGE CAMPBELL: ready? 10 MR. LUTZKER: Thank you. My name is Arnie 11 12 Lutzker and I'm counsel for Independent Producers 13 Group. And I would like to say just right off the bat 14 that these are issues that are very well briefed in 15 the documents that you already have and I appreciate 16 the opportunity for oral argument and we hope we can 17 sort of zone in on areas of concern, I'm comfortable that we have addressed in our court 18 19 pleadings and MPAA has in its pleadings the primary 20 issues. 21 And really, for purposes of the instant 2.2 motion to dismiss the IPG claim, the way I understood

their claim, it really is divided into two parts. This first part about legal authority of the Copyright Office to do what it did and then separately whether or not IPG by virtue of additional documentation, meeting the request of the Copyright Office to satisfy its obligations.

I'd like to also put in context which again I think is clear in the pleadings from both my experience and understanding and interpreting the Copyright Office's concerns in this area. First and foremost, the Copyright Office has on some occasions in the past dealt with the issue about a claimant that appears late on the scene and the concern which the MPA motion appears to address really goes to that core concern.

To what extent is a claimant arriving late on the scene, in other words, after July 31 of a particular year, referencing back to the prior year, to what extent is that claimant arriving late on the scene such that by virtue of statutory requirements, the Copyright Office should preclude the claim from even being heard.

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Now fundamentally, we have a situation with IPG of an entity that has filed a claim. The issue is is the claim defective in certain respects which I'll get to in a minute, but there is no question that it did file on behalf of itself and the parties that it was representing, what it understood to be a timely proper claim under the rules of the Copyright Office.

Now the Copyright Office in response to the concerns raised by the MPAA took a closer look and determined that the issue of what is a joint claim, because this is, in essence, what we're talking about. What is a joint claim. It's a matter that has not been necessarily fully litigated before the Copyright Office, fully understood, and it interpreted its own rules as having some ambiguity.

It also indicated in the course of its ruling on this motion that it has -- it's a matter of first impression, that it doesn't know -- it knows that there have been joint claims filed in the past, but it doesn't know that all the parties that have filed joint claims in the past have, in fact,

satisfied the obligations of the rules that they might want to interpret.

Therefore, it established what characterized perhaps as a unique exception for IPG, but may have other applications to other parties in this proceeding and maybe in future years as we sort of are dealing with 1997 now. There may be parties that will benefit from Copyright the Office's interpretation issued in the Year 2000. So the calendar years 1997, 1998, and 1999 for which claims have already been filed may have the benefit of interpretation under this exception as defined by the Copyright Office.

Now fundamentally, and this is where, again, I believe it's addressed in our pleadings, but the fundamental core concept that we're dealing with here is the Copyright Office's willingness to issue an exception to an interpretation of its own rules. It issued the rules.

It's interpreting these rules and it's granting an exception. In fact, earlier in the case an exception was granted for the MPAA in connection

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with their filing of an intent to participate in this proceeding. There were some issues as to whether that was filed timely or not and the circumstances and the Copyright Office allowed the MPAA to file a waiver request which was granted. And, as a practical matter, IPG is not challenging that waiver request, but it puts in context that the Copyright Office is allowed to interpret its own regulations and this goes again to the authority that you were vested in.

I did interpret and maybe this latter list interchange with the Honorable Mr. Davis and counsel, raised a question of whether or not they are, MPAA, is asking for this Panel to overturn the rulings of the Copyright Office. There was certainly more than a whiff of that in the pleadings and that's the way I think it was fair to construe what they were asking for.

Clearly, from our perspective, the Panel under the statute is going to be following the statute, the orders of the Librarian, past CRT and CARP decisions. And it fits in that context if this is an order that we would anticipate the Panel to

respect because ultimately, the Copyright Office and the Librarian of Congress is going to be reviewing your decision. You make the recommendations and it is the -- under the statute, it is the Librarian who makes the decision to accept or reject those rulings and to the extent it has already ruled on this issue, and interpreted its rules in terms of the definition of a joint claim, it has already issued an authoritated opinion on that point.

And I might add that in the course of the commentary in this proceeding, MPA's it had opportunity to comment upon this order and in fact, it gave what I read to be a green light from a constitutional perspective with regard to the decision of the panel and it's quoted -- we quote, it's just really a couple of sentences that I'll reiterate.

It's on page 7 of our brief, but in one of the briefs filed by the MPAA responding to this order they said "there were no constitutional restraints on the Copyright Office's authority fashioning the ruling in this case to safeguard the processes from illegitimate claimants and conformity with copyright

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regulations is indisputable permissible."

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We don't disagree with that and now from a policy point of view and I think this is important for the Panel to understand, from a policy point of view, the Copyright Office was fundamentally concerned in its order of June 22 that there be parties at the table participating in the claimed proceeding by July 31st of the given year. That's the critical date. That's the critical concept. It says in its ruling in order to preserve the integrity of the rules, it is establishing the context in which it will grant an exception to the interpretation of the joint claim provision as filed by -- a joint claim is filed by IPG.

The preservation of the integrity of the rules goes to have these claimants that IPG represents participated in a material way, in an overt way, in a clear enough way that the Panel can say yes, they had authorized IPG prior to July 31 of 1998 to represent them in this very proceeding. Because what happened, by virtue of that authority, these entities did not file individual claims. They were in a situation of

(a) knowing what they had to do, asking, committing, contracting with someone to do it in their stead and then not taking an action which would have otherwise allowed them to be in a position to make claim for royalties.

And so it's critical as you look at this that you recognize that there is a process that's gone Part of the interpretation and I'd say it's forth. really an interpretation that MPA wishes to impose on the agreements are that oh, these agreements by using a phrase dated "as-of" automatically, automatically presume that the claimants themselves had no relationship with IPG or actually the agreements are with WSG, had no relationship with WSG, Worldwide Subsidy Group, prior to July 31. They obviously came in later. Their interpretation of dated as-of, by definition their only definition means it's a back dating, even though Black's Dictionary not only defines it as back dating, it also is when agreements are signed in different places by the two parties or multiple parties to an agreement by the definition in Black's Dictionary.

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JUDGE COOLEY: Can I stop you there? 1 MR. LUTZKER: 2 Sure. But then isn't it really 3 JUDGE COOLEY: 4 ambiquous? I mean are we left with an ambiguous situation? 5 6 LUTZKER: You are left with some 7 ambiguity, I would agree. And the nature of clarity 8 of these documents is not precise because we didn't 9 have the benefit when the documents were being written of the interpretations and you know, what's come over 10 11 these past number of months. 12 Obviously, claimants -- you would behoove claimants that want to file joint claims to identify 13 every entity that they represent in a joint claim, 14 15 even though the regulations have ambiguity. 16 But yes, there is ambiguity in language and that's the purpose of these additional 17 documents, what we call the October 10 documents are 18 19 provided in to facilitate the а way 20 understanding of the relationships that existed at the time the claims had to be filed. And in the case of 21

only one of the 14 companies that are represented in

connection with these claims, only one of them were there no documents that were afforded.

Now the documentation and remember, in the Copyright Office ruling, they didn't say we had to have the representation agreement as drafted by IPG They were looking for, in effect, signed. document that evidenced by signature, by initials, the order speaks of initialing. It speaks of a minimum level of evidence to satisfy you that yes, there was a relationship, a legal relationship. Maybe all the terms were not there. IPG deals not only with the United States copyright market, it deals with an international copyright market. Maybe there are other terms to analyze. Maybe even there are some terms that go to the term of years that we're going to be represented. There may be terms that go to the method of accounting and payments. There may be other arrangements to be made. The critical concern that you have that the Copyright Office charged you with is figuring out did these entities who are for other valid claimants, did they participate sufficiently in an understanding with IPG such that

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1	you can make a judgment and say yes, by July 31, there
2	was enough of a legal relationship, a legal, binding,
3	contractual relationship. Forget all the critical
4	elements of term and how much he may be paid. There
5	are critical elements and these critical elements are
6	and are you going to file my claim on my behalf?
7	That's the critical relationship. If that's
8	established, the concern of the Copyright Office with
9	regard to the July 31 date is met in our view because
10	what it means is that yes, there was a relationship
11	between a claimant and an entity filing the clam and
12	the failure to list these 15 entities on a sheet of
13	paper attached to the claim which is the essence of
14	the defect of this claim. It's not that agreements
15	don't exist. There obviously are agreements. The
16	agreements have ambiguities, we admit that. It is
17	that the claim itself did not list the 15 parties, the
18	14 parties that it had relationships with even though
19	it had agreements and understandings with that. And
20	the nature of the representation agreements themselves
21	are ones I do want to provide additional commentary
22	on, but that remains the critical concern of the

Panel. Can you discern from the material that was
submitted on October 10th whether there was a
relationship sufficient in your judgment to say that
a party that could have filed a claim did not file it
and authorized Worldwide Subsidy Group to make that
filing. That's the critical concern. And the
Copyright Office because and our view is pointed
out in earlier documents and one of the unique aspects
of this case is that you'll see depending upon the way
the wind blows, arguments that are made on one side of
the table also have applicability to the other side of
the table. The question of oral agreements. We had
made an argument to the Copyright Office. The law
allows for oral understandings. There's nothing
unusual about oral understandings. And there is
nothing illegal about an entity, Tide Group, orally
advising Worldwide Subsidy Group, you represent me.
If Worldwide Subsidy Group puts Tide Group on an
attachment, even though there's no written agreement,
that would satisfy the Copyright Office's concern.

JUDGE CAMPBELL: Except that -- I'm sorry.

JUDGE COOLEY: Go ahead.

JUDGE COOLEY: Go ahead

JUDGE CAMPBELL: Except that you must realize in this instance there was a special dispensation, if you will, provided that said it had to be in writing, signed and executed prior to July 31, 1998.

MR. LUTZKER: Ι agree. That's the argument we made before the Copyright Office's ruling. In other words, we're saying before the Copyright Office ruled in June -- June 22nd, in our original briefing papers and response to the motion to dismiss, we argued you can take an oral agreement and it can be binding and in papers that MPA has submitted in the proceedings we're criticizing where their representation agreements they say well, you can take an oral agreement. Of course, you can. The law allows that.

The special issue here is the Copyright Office to preserve the integrity of the process of the July 31 filing date, to preserve that, impose an extra requirement on IPG and that's what unique, perhaps, although there may be others that need this as well. What is unique is they want it in writing because they

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said it has to be -- a filing is in writing, therefore 1 2 we want to see a writing, something that comes from the pen of the claimant that IPG is representing. 3 want to see something in writing in order to preserve 4 5 the integrity of the July 31 processing date. JUDGE COOLEY: 6 Do you have any other 7 questions? I just want to make sure I understand 8 because this is critical to this argument here. 9 10 MR. LUTZKER: Sure. JUDGE COOLEY: The words of the Copyright 11 12 Office counsel was other documents signed or initialed 13 by Exhibit D claimant can serve as written proof of representation provided that (1) they clearly and 14 15 unambiguously provide that a representation agreement 16 has been reached -- has been reached -- between IPG and Exhibit D claimant; and (2) the document existed 17 on or before July 31, 1998. 18 19 Let me give you a hypothetical. I want to 20 find out what you're really arguing. Are you arguing 21 that there could have been a -- let's just say a blank 22

agreement in place, one that you use maybe with

several claimants or clients or customers, whatever you want to call it, okay? Are you making an argument that you had that in blank, that you had discussed it, that you had reached a representation agreement in principle anyway, but yet it was not technically confirmed until later in correspondence? Are you making the argument that that should qualify under the Copyright Office's criteria?

MR. LUTZKER: The Copyright Office wants something in writing.

JUDGE COOLEY: Right.

MR. LUTZKER: Yes, they want a representation agreement. It doesn't have to be the full two pages of this agreement as laid out by -- as initiated, I'll call it, by Worldwide Subsidy Group. It can be -- the agreement for representation does not have to be all these terms, but there has to be an agreement and it has to be in writing.

Now the evidence, first of all, all the agreements in question have the "as-of" date, so there is ambiguity, but then there is also a question of does the ambiguity without any additional testimony,

without any additional, there's no evidence, example, that the "as-of" date does not refer to does not refer to sending in different faxing, directions, from different cities. There is ambiguity there in the question in a motion to dismiss at this point whether you would construe, whether you would throw out a claimant in the MPA's words, "whether you would entirely dismiss the case" which we questions about, given the Lacy situation. But under the circumstances, that you would entirely throw out a case on their sort of interpretation and we have an alternative interpretation. Our position is on that particular point, that if there is a factual dispute, the case goes forward, facts are collected and then the issue can be dealt with at a later point. You don't have to dismiss a case at this point.

Nevertheless, we feel that in addition, the documentation clearly and unambiguously establishes a relationship and how can I say that? Well, a couple of things. First of all, none of the parties involved, none of the parties involved filed an independent claim. From their perspective, they

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had an understanding that someone was doing it on their behalf or otherwise they would just forego the opportunity of the claim and I don't think there's any basis in the record to suggest that they would just normally forego the opportunity of the claim if there's money coming due to them.

Secondly, there is documentation and I think sufficient documentation as the Panel in its initial review of this material concluded, there is sufficient documentation to bring to closure the question of was there a sufficient degree of relationship prior to July 31 or July 31 or before, between the claimant and Worldwide Subsidy Group and I think the issues as presented -- that issue as presented with the material is answered in the affirmative. Yes, there was that relationship.

There are documents and I would perhaps just sort of take a look. It's intriguing, you know, as an example, that two of these documents, actually all three of the documents that were sort of just handed out, the Tide Group, this is dated as of June 30, okay? Now reading it for IPG, worse case, as of

1	June 30, gives us one more month to try to deal with
2	this problem, the unartfulness of the drafting aside.
3	We submitted documentation which we are satisfied
4	addresses this issue. One of the things that you'll
5	see which is the most lengthy of the documents is a
6	detailed posting for period ending June 30, 1980.
7	It's a general ledger which comes from the Tide Group.
8	JUDGE CAMPBELL: I have a question on
9	that. The general ledger is titled New Lauderdale
10	LLC. How does that allow us to relate it to the Tide
11	Group?
	-
12	MR. LUTZKER: I will get back to that.
12	MR. LUTZKER: I will get back to that.
12	MR. LUTZKER: I will get back to that. JUDGE CAMPBELL: Okay, as long as you get
12 13 14	MR. LUTZKER: I will get back to that. JUDGE CAMPBELL: Okay, as long as you get back to it, forge ahead.
12 13 14 15	MR. LUTZKER: I will get back to that. JUDGE CAMPBELL: Okay, as long as you get back to it, forge ahead. MR. LUTZKER: The documentation also
12 13 14 15	MR. LUTZKER: I will get back to that. JUDGE CAMPBELL: Okay, as long as you get back to it, forge ahead. MR. LUTZKER: The documentation also provides, but in other words, the critical thing with
12 13 14 15 16	MR. LUTZKER: I will get back to that. JUDGE CAMPBELL: Okay, as long as you get back to it, forge ahead. MR. LUTZKER: The documentation also provides, but in other words, the critical thing with respect to this documentation is that this is
12 13 14 15 16 17	MR. LUTZKER: I will get back to that. JUDGE CAMPBELL: Okay, as long as you get back to it, forge ahead. MR. LUTZKER: The documentation also provides, but in other words, the critical thing with respect to this documentation is that this is confidential documentation which a party would not
12 13 14 15 16 17 18	MR. LUTZKER: I will get back to that. JUDGE CAMPBELL: Okay, as long as you get back to it, forge ahead. MR. LUTZKER: The documentation also provides, but in other words, the critical thing with respect to this documentation is that this is confidential documentation which a party would not send to anybody. It would be sent to someone with

understanding of the representation.

1	In addition
2	JUDGE CAMPBELL: I have a question.
3	MR. TUCCI: Sure.
4	JUDGE CAMPBELL: How do the detailed
5	postings for these various periods relate to each
6	representation agreement? Just in brief. Check
7	register
8	MR. TUCCI: I'm advised these show ad buys
9	for particular programming, so they are designed to
10	assist one in identifying syndicated activities.
11	Now I would add and I'll get to the
12	I'll answer that other question after a break.
13	MR. ADKINS: Sure.
14	MR. TUCCI: In terms of the reference to
15	the July 8, 1998 fax that was sent from Worldwide
16	Subsidy Group to the Psychic Readers Network which is
17	the d/b/a of the Tide Group, it speaks of this is
18	dated July 8th. It speaks in terms of a fax. It
19	speaks in terms of conversations that morning. It
20	speaks in terms of a revision to a document and it
21	speaks in terms of representation with respect to this

Psychic Readers Network programming.

Now there are two or three things that are First, the agreement that is dated as of relevant. June 30 is a different document than the one that is attached here to this agreement which suggests that this document predates the faxed version sent, that this is a -- it's an on-going process of negotiations between Worldwide Subsidy Group and the individual claimants in of the terms of the nuances representation agreement, not to the core question of representation, but to issues as far as accounting, you'll see that the accounting and payment section has some different terminology and it goes to the issue of at what point has there been an agreement.

And under any circumstances the date of July 8th, even taking this at its face value, the date of July 8th being faxed to the party and an agreement that is executed by the party as of the June 30th date. You'll notice too that the June 30th date is typed in in that agreement. I take this argument back. I was thinking about another agreement. This one is the same document. There was another document I was thinking about.

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This document is faxed to the party for July 8th. It is dated as of June 30th. There were revisions to the representation well within the time period. We have an executed agreement well within the time period and communications between the parties well within the time period including the provision of the details for the postings for the programming. All this is direct evidence of the relationship that existed between Worldwide Subsidy Group and the claimant prior to July 31st.

With regard to the --

JUDGE CAMPBELL: Keep going. I can ask this overall, I think.

MR. LUTZKER: Again, with regard to the complaint that was made with respect to the Golden Films finance, this agreement is an agreement dated as of June 20th.

There is a fax dated June 22nd. Contemporaneous with the agreement, this is the one that I was thinking of before that had some changes in the actual text between a red line version and the execution copy, but the circumstances of the signing

of this agreement dated as of June 20th, together with the communications in June of 1998 clearly evidenced a relationship that existed before July 31st, satisfying the Copyright Office's concern that Worldwide Subsidy Group be representative of the claimant in a timely manner such that the integrity of the July 31st day is maintained.

JUDGE CAMPBELL: Let's talk about Golden Films. I have some questions on that one particularly with regard to who is Worldwide Subsidy Group? In the Golden Films agreement, Worldwide Subsidy warrants in Section 7, it's a California limited liability company. Now MPA raises some previous filings and the Secretary of the State of California does not list that limited liability company.

In addition, in the Library of Congress' order of 6/28 of this year, on page 1 there's a quote, "Raul Galaz states in his testimony that IPG is a separate entity from Worldwide Subsidy Group which filed the claim in this proceeding." And then IPG written direct case at 3. And then Program Suppliers see documents that show the corporate structure. IPG

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asserts that there are no such documents because IPG is a fictitious name for Worldwide Subsidy Group.

Then in your Independent Producers Group opposition to the motion to dismiss that was received at the Copyright Office on December 1, you are stating in your filed material here, "the MPAA knows and the record is quite clear" apparently to all but me "that Independent Producers Group is a fictitious business name for Worldwide Subsidy Group of Texas. Worldwide Subsidy Group of California is the entity that filed claim number 176 for 1997 cable rate transmission royalties."

Further it states that "the California and the Texas Worldwide Subsidy Groups are distinct legal entities. The Texas one is not a corporation, but it was created by articles of organization in 1999."

So why are we calling this party IPG if IPG Texas is the real and true IPG and not Worldwide Subsidy Group. I'm getting really confused between all of your --

MR. LUTZKER: There are two Worldwide Subsidy Groups.

11.

1	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Right. One is in
2	California
3	MR. LUTZKER: California is the one that
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5	JUDGE CAMPBELL: The filing party.
6	MR. LUTZKER: Right. Worldwide Subsidy
7	Group of Texas was formed in 1999.
8	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Right. I've got that
9	part.
10	MR. LUTZKER: And IPG and Worldwide
11	Subsidy Group Texas are the same entity.
12	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Right, I've got that.
13	MR. LUTZKER: And IPG represents the claim
14	of Worldwide Subsidy Group California.
15	JUDGE CAMPBELL: All right, that hadn't
16	been clear. So the Texas corporation represents
17	which is IPG/WSG, represents the claim here of
18	Worldwide Subsidy Group California which is an LLC or
19	not?
20	MR. GALAZ: Can I speak? I'm Raul Galaz.
21	Actually, in California it was first organized as
22	Artist Collection Group LLC. It ultimately, we filed

papers to make Worldwide Subsidy Group the fictitious 1 business name in California for Artist Collection 2 3 Group LLC and there are no Secretary of State filings for fictitious business names in California. 4 are done on a county by county basis. 5 6 JUDGE CAMPBELL: It seemed confusing to me 7 because the backup documents of October 10th showed a and American Films request by the Golden Films 8 9 Investment Corporation, just for their purpose to know 10 with whom they were dealing. 11 MR. LUTZKER: Right. 12 JUDGE CAMPBELL: And the response was that it was Worldwide Subsidy Group in California LLC. And 13 as a result, that confusion had played out here. 14 15 MR. LUTZKER: And that was also clarified 16 in terms of the short cutting of this for the most 17 recent motions. It had been dealt with in earlier, 18 both provisions of discovery documents and int he 19 motion paper filed in May. 20 JUDGE CAMPBELL: So the IPG, WSG Texas is 2.1 a separate corporation from the California -- separate

entity, it's not a corporation. But is it a separate

entity from the WSG California --1 2 MR. LUTZKER: Correct. JUDGE CAMPBELL: Which is, in fact, a 3 fictitious name for a party that I believe withdrew 4 earlier. Is that correct? 5 6 MR. LUTZKER: Yes. 7 JUDGE CAMPBELL: So if they withdrew, are they still in? I'm lost here. Didn't they withdraw 8 at the beginning of the case? 9 MR. LUTZKER: The Worldwide Subsidy Group 10 1.1 and there's a document, and the Golden Films, this may 12 sort of help visualize it. Five pages from the back of what was just distributed. There is a fax cover 13 14 sheet that says Worldwide Subsidy Group, FKA, formerly 15 known as Artist Collection Group. Separately, there's 16 also correspondence with Artist Collection Group. The confusion, if you will, comes from the 17 18 multiplicity of names associated with many of the same 19 really pretty much the same players. In 20 California, Artist Collection Group and Worldwide 21 Subsidy Group are related entities in terms of Texas,

Worldwide Subsidy Group and Independent Producers

Group are related entities.

JUDGE CAMPBELL: I have a question. If you can refer to the order of June 22, on page 5 the Library states that "IPG states in its written direct case that Artist Collection Group has withdrawn its claim because it did not represent any copyright owners who programs who were being transmitted by cable systems during 1997." And that's IPG's direct case at 2. "This leaves Worldwide Subsidy Group as the sole identified claimant."

However, if as you say Worldwide Subsidy Group is a fictitious name or a DBA for Artist Collection Group, then it's withdrawn its claim which would mean that perhaps the WGS that's in Texas is the one, but that's not the one that's signed these representation agreements and I'm back to where I'm confused as to who is the IPG of the day. It's like that program, will the real IPG please stand up?

MR. LUTZKER: We know who the real IPG is.

The real IPG is also known as the Worldwide Subsidy

Group in Texas.

In terms of the claimants in California,

1	the original claim was filed and let me just take, if
2	I can bear with you for one second, just to confer and
3	make sure my understanding is correct too.
4	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Why don't we take a
5	break? It's almost 20 after. That will give you a
6	chance to get into the other issue we wanted to
7	discuss. Everybody can run and get water or whatever
8	and we can do likewise and maybe come back at about
9	4:35 and we won't make that a 45 minute break again.
10	MR. LUTZKER: Okay, great. Thank you.
11	(Off the record.)
12	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Thank you. And, again,
13	please be seated. If you wish to take your jackets
14	off, it's warm in here, feel free to do so.
15	All right, Mr. Lutzker.
16	MR. LUTZKER: Okay. I'll try to answer
17	your two outstanding questions.
18	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Thank you.
19	MR. LUTZKER: The first is in terms of who
20	is New Lauderdale, L.L.C.
21	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Right.
22	MR. LUTZKER: The answer is we're not
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sure, okay? This document was sent in response to a request to the Tide Group. It was provided directly from them. It was faxed. It's obviously confidential information from their files. It is conceivable that like -- if you look at the Tide Group agreement, you've got the Tide Group, Inc. d/b/a Psychic Readers Network. They probably operate under different names, and this may be their their distribution Lauderdale, L.L.C. may be collection arm or whatever, but it was not provided -again, these are documents that go back now to 1998, and they weren't obtained -- they were pulled from the We just delivered them as evidence that records. there was that relationship existing.

It was provided because it's highly confidential material. And the reasonable assumption that we made is that it comes from the Tide -- it was asked from the Tide Group. It comes from them; it's their documentation. That's all I can say about that. I mean, if at hearing it turns that it's useful to provide any more information between now and then, presumably we'd have the opportunity to clarify that.

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JUDGE CAMPBELL: Thank you.

MR. LUTZKER: In terms of the artist rights, the artist rights -- or the Artist Collection Group, Worldwide Subsidy Group, I think the way I would characterize it is that sometimes various sorts of organizations come up with a number of different names.

Now, in connection with the California corporation, the California entity, the Artist Collection Group, as a practical matter, when it entered into agreements, it typically dealt in foreign rights. And when it was dealing in domestic rights, Worldwide Subsidy Group was a signatory. At the time the claim was filed, it was unclear -- but they're the same entity. In other words, one is the corporate name and strikes deals for foreign rights. The other is the d/b/a and strikes deals for domestic rights. But they're the same operation.

It was thought at the time the claim was filed that some of the parties signing the international rights also have domestic rights, and therefore it was filed on behalf of Artist Collection

Group and Worldwide Subsidy Group, even though they were the same -- technically the same entity, it was viewed in a more formal strict sense that I had contracts under one name and I had contracts under the other name. And that's why the two names were used.

the direct When case was being put together, the contracts for the Artist Collection Group were analyzed, and it was determined that they were indeed foreign contracts not domestic contracts. Therefore, the withdrawal of them as a seemingly separate entity -- I mean there's an unartfulness, obviously, about this, but withdrawal of them, it was not intended to sort of by their -- thereby dismiss their WSG named operation. It's really the same thing, and so the effort was made to clarify that we're really dealing with Worldwide Subsidy Group which is the domestic claims contracted for in this proceeding. And there are no, obviously no foreign claims. And, that so the intent of was the explanation in the direct case.

And, again, I think it is not an uncommon practice in media companies to have a multiplicity of

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names and sometimes keeping track of these can have In our case, we have an entity that some confusion. has chosen to operate under two different names: in California, the Artist Collection Group and Worldwide Subsidy Group; in Texas, Worldwide Subsidy Group and Independent Producers Group. JUDGE CAMPBELL: Thank you. MR. LUTZKER: I guess I'm trying to pick up --Pick up where you left JUDGE CAMPBELL: off. MR. LUTZKER: -- where I left off. And maybe the simplicity is primarily to summarize. The documents that have been provided, as I said, go to the nature of the relationship. I did want to sort of -- the other issue that's sort of been raised is this Negro College Fund, and again, the issue is for present purposes -- and again, the context in which the document we provided on October 10 were provided

in as strict compliance as we could understand the

tried to do was say here's a record of material that

Copyright Office's regulation or decision.

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we have in our files that evidence the relationships that existed between Worldwide Subsidy Group and these 14 entities.

The documents do not necessarily speak for themselves, and to some degree there can be confusion with respect to them, but these are the documents. The Copyright Office's concern was that there be a writing set prior to July 31 that establishes a relationship, and they wanted it in writing. They didn't want oral testimony to say, "I spoke to somebody. We had an oral deal, and therefore go ahead." We needed to provide writing.

The writings may require, and this is where I would differ with my good friend representing MPAA, I do not believe the Copyright Office prohibits IPG from offering oral testimony helping the panel to understand documentation. I do not believe the rulings of the Copyright Office would wish the panel to err in dismissing a claim where clarification or explanation will be apparent from a witness offering testimony.

The Copyright Office, because of its

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concern about the July 31 integrity of its rules, wanted something in writing. So, our record is fixed. We can't go beyond these documents. We can't say that on such and such date in May, July, July things happened. We have to speak from the documents, and we should be allowed to speak from the documents if you have a question.

Our view is that the agreements on their face satisfy the requirements. They raise ambiguity. The question is how do you interpret the ambiguities? In light of these additional documents, we feel that you made the correct decision with respect to most of these documents when you had your first crack at them. And we have no doubt that this may be matters that are additionally raised during the course of the hearing, but the acceptance of ten of these claimants by virtue of these documents we feel is correct.

With respect to the United Negro College Fund, I mean here you have a situation where there's correspondence, it's a faxed correspondence dated July 30, it's agreed and accepted, and MPAA would have you believe that this document must be construed as being

transmitted, executed, and delivered after August 1, and I don't see how they can do that. If you look on the face of this document, this is a faxed document; it is signed by both parties; it recognizes the authority of the Worldwide Subsidy Group. This is what the Copyright Office wanted. It could have been initialed; it's signed. It said, "We're confirming the understanding that you're going to represent us in this proceeding."

And the alternative would be to throw out this entity that we believe, manifested by the documents that are before you, has shown an intent, a willingness, and timely willingness to participate in this proceeding. And the only failing that its representative, WSG/IPG, is being accused of is not attaching a list to the claim that United Negro College Fund of the applicants its was one representing.

JUDGE CAMPBELL: I have a question. If you look at the July 30, 1998 letter to Bill Allen of the United Negro College Fund, the agreement accepted, as both parties have indicated, is not dated. But if

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you read carefully the November 20 letter, it does raise some issues. As I mentioned in our conversation after, "Dear Mr. Allen, Worldwide Subsidy Group is a company specializing in the application for and collection of audio-visual royalties distributed by governmental agencies. A more thorough description of our services exists in the letter previously sent to David Brokaw, previously forwarded to your office, and I attach that letter in the event that it is not at your disposal."

I haven't seen any previous letter to David Brokaw. It wasn't attached to this. But this paragraph appears to be an introduction of the services of Worldwide Subsidy. The second paragraph indicates that the deadline for receiving certain monies from one agency has passed, see the Brokaw letter, and then indicating that there are other deadlines that occur several times throughout the year. The next paragraph talks about the commission basis upon which the Worldwide Subsidy Group operates, including their fees and filings.

This November 20 letter very much sounds

like we're introducing our services; we don't have a relationship; this is how we work.

Right. And what is LUTZKER: explained is Worldwide Subsidy Group, as I indicated earlier, described in the Artist Collection Group, deals with international collections, not just the United States cable royalties; collections in France and Europe and Australia and Canada, Latin America and elsewhere. And that ability the expand relationships is what this letter is dealing with.

In the case of the particular issue that you raised, there were Latin, South American claims that could have been missed in terms of deadlines. This deals with the international practice. The July 30 letter clearly and unambiguously establishes a relationship with the Lou Rawls Parade of Stars and other projects by the United Negro College Fund.

So, it is a solicitation, but it's a solicitation of an expansion of business. Maybe it's unartfully done. Maybe it sounds like instead of -you know, let me go back for one second to this letter
-- instead of saying, "Dear Mr. Allen," it should say,

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"Dear Bill, because now we're good chums because we're representing you." But the way people write letters does not necessarily create the ambiguities that are being imposed on them.

JUDGE CAMPBELL: Well, I'm not concerned so much of the form as the substance, and it appears that there is a question about when the agreed and accepted item would have been dated. And there is a question in my mind, at least at this point, about the November 20, 1998 and what the David Brokaw letter might have said to more thoroughly examine this issue.

MR. LUTZKER: Then I would respectfully suggest this: The issue that you have to resolve is basically the death sentence with respect to this particular claimant. If there are ambiguities that go questions that may arise, testimony addressed to that. I do not read the Copyright Office's order as precluding clarification of any of documents that have been provided to you. However, where we have a document that is dated as of July 30, where we have a faxed document signed by an officer of the claimant dated July 30, the Copyright

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Office said, "Show me something that says this was executed prior to August 1 of 1998." That was the exact date.

This document shows that. MPAA is raising issues about it. They're entitled to, but they're not entitled to in the context of a motion to dismiss. We have met our burden with respect to the presumption that there is a lawful relationship between United Negro College Fund and IPG for purposes of the claim filed timely in 1998. And if there are other issues that wish to be addressed, they can be addressed during the course of examination -- course examination.

JUDGE COOLEY: Mr. Lutzker, it seems that you and Mr. Tucci disagree on whether or not testimony is admissible on this particular issue. And I want to clarify for the record, are you requesting permission to introduce testimony on this issue or what?

MR. LUTZKER: In terms of -- I mean, we have made our case, which is essentially that IPG represents a group of 14 entities. Our direct case will be presented. There will be, as opposing counsel

has the right, cross examination, and they can raise issues based upon the discovery documents. These are a sense, at this point, discovery documents, and they have a right to cross examine and ask questions, and we have a right in redirect to address open issues.

JUDGE COOLEY: Well, I guess the question I have is we're going to have to make a decision on these particular claimants that have been brought into issue here. And the question I have is even before we get to the hearing on the merits, we still have to get through the threshold issue of who is a claimant whom you are representing. And the question I have is maybe the answer is simple. Maybe you're not asking to introduce any testimony on these issues.

MR. LUTZKER: Our position is this: that the documents satisfy the Copyright Office's requirements by providing clearly and unambiguously, in the case of the United Negro College Fund, a signed agreement in addition to the other agreement, a signed document dated July 30. That, in our view, satisfies the concern of the Copyright Office. There is always issues when you're dealing with documents as to the

authenticity of the document, the timeliness, and it could be raised with respect to anyone. But in terms of on its face has this document satisfied the obligations, we believe it has. Nevertheless, the motion to dismiss has been renewed, it has been presented.

Our position is that you cannot, in light of this document, say that we have not clearly and unambiguously met the obligations that the Copyright Office has imposed on us, because remember, I mean the Copyright Office receives 600, 700, 800 claims filed in a given year. The scrutiny that's attached to the claims occurs not at when they're received. There is some ministerial analysis that is made, but if they are facially accepted, it then goes to the proceeding. And then it goes to -- if there is a contested proceeding, it would go to testimony of both sides with respect to those documents.

There's no evidence that MPAA has introduced that says this document was not signed on July 30. They can question it, but they haven't introduced any contrary evidence with respect to any

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one of these. They've added their interpretation, their analysis. That's their right to do so. But our obligation was to provide written material to you that shows that that relationship fundamental to filing the claim existed in a timely manner so that the integrity of the July 31st date would not be impugned. And we feel we've done that.

I believe that Mr. JUDGE COOLEY: Okay. Tucci alleged anyway that there be other documents in your files that relate these particular to representation agreements. We see reference to a Brokaw letter, if nothing else. Are there other documents that are in the file -- one of these files?

MR. LUTZKER: There could be. Let me put in the context the procedure by which these documents were assembled, and it involved -- we may get to this at a later point today or perhaps tomorrow -- these telephone conversations. The Copyright Office -- we sought clarification of the Copyright Office's ruling, because we, as I said earlier, believe that oral agreements have a binding relationship to parties, that you can agree orally and that can then bind you,

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that can constitute a contract, and you can enter into a written documentation later. In some cases you never enter into written documentation.

The Copyright Office, as I said, to preserve the integrity, wanted to see something in writing. They said, "You've got to file a claim. That's got to be in writing. If we're going to give you an exception, we're going to impose this burden. You've got to show us something in writing."

It then comes to the question about -- now I've lost my train of thought.

JUDGE COOLEY: There are other documents.

MR. LUTZKER: The other documents. The Copyright Office -- we sought reconsideration. The Copyright Office spelled out its details. The documentation the Copyright Office initially wanted to be produced in, if I recall, and Greg may have a recollection as well, I believe it was within two days. And under the circumstances of timing we asked for an additional period, and they said the 10th. I think the end result amounted to an extra week of assembling documentation.

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I called my client, I said, "Here's the deal. Pull together what you can." He went through his files. He has files that were shipped in boxes from California. There may be things in storage. He pulled together everything that he had, and from our point of view we're stuck with this, in a sense. We're stuck with we can have no more documentation proving our case than what is here.

not aware of any additional documentation. I don't know whether he's aware. Obviously, if there's a reference to a letter, a letter may exist, but it may not exist, okay? In terms of what was discerned in the files, we provided the material that was there. If additional discovery is deemed appropriate and if additional research is requested, the party's obligation is to go back check again and see if there's anything else. I mean at the moment, I'm not aware of anything else, but as I said, we're limited, in terms of advancing our case, to the documents that we've presented.

Well, they started saying -- pleading speak a lot to this, though. I will, unless you have

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other specific questions --1 Mr. Lutzker, are you 2 JUDGE CAMPBELL: finished for the moment? 3 MR. LUTZKER: 4 Yes. Thank you. Mr. Tucci, JUDGE CAMPBELL: 5 feel free. 6 7 MR. TUCCI: Thank you. I will be brief, although I've said that before. 8 A couple of points specifically address to 9 10 some of the arguments Mr. Lutzker made. Mr. Lutzker asserted that the program suppliers have not come 11 12 forward with any proof that, for example, United Negro 13 College Fund letter agreement was not executed prior to August 1, 1998. Again, that's not our burden. 14 15 is their burden to demonstrate compliance with the criteria of the Copyright Office that it was executed 16 prior to August 1998. The burden is not on us. 17 The 18 burden is on IPG. One of the other points that Mr. Lutzker 19 20 made was that MPAA had received the benefit of an 21 exception from the Copyright Office. That is in fact

Let me read exactly what the Copyright

It said, and this was in the context of Office. 1 probably our next motion regarding the representation 2 agreements that the program suppliers had --3 JUDGE CAMPBELL: Was that in an order, 4 sir? 5 MR. TUCCI: Yes, it is. 6 7 JUDGE CAMPBELL: Could you identify the order? 8 9 MR. TUCCI: The order is the June 22nd 10 order. JUDGE CAMPBELL: Thank you. 11 12 MR. TUCCI: It's in a different portion 13 dealing with something other than the motion to What the Copyright Office said, it said, 14 dismiss. 15 "IPG submits that Lacey Entertainment and General Mills' failure to file a timely Notice of Intent to 16 Participate has the same effect as failing to timely 17 18 file a claim." We disagree. Timely submission of a claim is a statutory requirement. 19 We lack the 20 authority to waive the requirement. A timely Notice 21 of Intent to Participate is a regulatory requirement,

and it is well established practice that a party

wishing to file an untimely notice may move for leave to do so.

So, what the Copyright Office was doing there was interpreting its regulations and allowing program suppliers to comply with those regulations through a motion. It stated explicitly on the record that the statutory requirement that it had found in exception on behalf of IPG for, it had no authority to do. This is basically the way I started the argument an hour and a half ago.

So, they're not the same situations. We're dealing with the regulations or we're dealing with the statute. They're not the same. And the Copyright Office's authority with respect to each is vastly different. It's not the same situation.

Mr. Lutzker also made the point that what you do here with respect to these claimants may shape future proceedings. That's absolutely not true. What the Copyright Office ordered regarding the IPG special exception, in the same order it stated that it would not hesitate to dismiss untimely joint claims in the future. It specifically said this is a one-time IPG

exception. It is not -- this is not regulatory practice going forward.

And I might add that the Copyright Office has never hesitated to find untimely and dismiss late filed claims. One program supplier a couple of years ago sent their claim form to the Copyright Office via Federal Express. Well, it's a post office box. Federal Express does not deliver to a post office box. But for that, it would have gotten here within the statutory time frame. The Copyright Office dismissed that claimant. It has no hesitation to dismiss a claimant except for some reason in this instance.

Now, this is a pretty cut and dry -- well, before I move on to that, let me make one other point with respect to the Copyright Office's dealings with this particular claim. I am not certain whether this document is attached to a pleading. I think that it is, but in the event that it's not, it is part of the official record to the Copyright Office. This is a letter to Mr. Galaz dated July 23, 1998, which is from the Copyright Office, which references a prior telephone conversation with a member of his office and

member of the staff of the Copyright Office, and it's detailing deficiencies in the claim submitted by Artist Collection Group, Limited. And it checks two The first box is the telephone number, boxes. facsimile that needs to be properly put on the claim. But most importantly, on the second page, the first box at the top of the page, it says "For joint claims. A concise statement of authorization for filing of a joint claim. And" -- underlined -- "the name of each claimant to the joint claim." They were told how to They didn't do it correctly. The Copyright Office has given them a special exception. They can't comply with the special exception. Their claim must be dismissed.

The balance of Mr. Lutzker's argument is basically an argument that this panel should create an exception to the special exception, and that is not warranted. This panel should enforce the statutory requirements for a valid joint claim, and if it agrees that an exception exists, it should strictly enforce the exception in this case. And as we've demonstrated, they can't comply -- IPG cannot comply

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with the exception created by the Copyright Office, 1 and this claim has to be dismissed. 2 May I have an opportunity 3 MR. LUTZKER: just to make two brief comments since the material's 4 been submitted. 5 is 6 JUDGE CAMPBELL: Ι think that appropriate. I think that's quite appropriate. 7 MR. LUTZKER: Again, I think the issue, 8 and I tried to explain earlier, is we're not dealing 9 with a statutory failing here. The claim was filed 10 prior to July 31, acknowledged by the Copyright Office 11 and the like. What we're dealing with 12 is misunderstanding of Copyright Office regulations, 13 which the Copyright Office has authority to waive. 14 15 In this case, a letter was sent saying 16 joint claims only have to have the name of each This was understood by Worldwide Subsidy 1.7 claimant. 18 Group, and if the record were complete, you would have

the original claim, which was filed in the name of Artist Collection Group as a joint claim. The error that was made at that point was the concept that you had Artist Collection Group and Worldwide Subsidy

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Group.

The amendment that was made in response to this letter was to add Worldwide Subsidy Group as a claimant so that you had Artist Collection Group and Worldwide Subsidy Group. The clear understanding or the clear misunderstanding by the claimant at that point in time was that the filing of a joint claim identifying Artist Collection Group and Worldwide Subsidy Group was the requirement.

The agreements with all the parties involved, as is discussed in sort of the earlier paperwork, go to the issue of each of these parties creating an authority, a transfer of the right to collect royalties to the Artist Collection Group. The understanding, and I'll call it the misunderstanding perhaps, under an interpretation of copyright law, is does that qualify you as a party to file a claim? I think it is reasonable to conclude it does qualify you as a party. The Copyright Office had problems under its regulation that you had to list all these other parties, all these other entities who were actually program owners. And, so the mere fact of the transfer

of the right to collect a royalty didn't elevate you at that point in time to the status of a claimant under the Copyright Office's interpretation.

But the bottom line is that a timely claim It didn't comply with, under the Copyright was filed. Office's interpretation, how a joint claim under its rules should be submitted. The Copyright Office waived its rules. Whether it's extraordinary or whether it will ever be repeated again, I think all precedent stands as precedent, and if someone ever wants to cite it again, they may, and a future panel may agree with it or not and the Copyright Office may I tend to think that for a agree with it or not. period of time it may have more vitality than my good colleague, but that doesn't go to the issue of our dispute.

The issue of our dispute is have we provided the documentation to establish that there was a relationship existing with these claimants, because we didn't attach to our claim a sheet that says these are the 14 companies we're representing by July 31. And that was our error. It was not malevolent or

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1	intentional. It was done in good faith with an
2	understanding, and it was wrong, according to the
3	Copyright Office's interpretation. We've submitted
4	more than enough documentation to establish
5	relationships that existed in writing between
6	claimants and the Worldwide Subsidy Group. And we
7	feel that in terms of the motion to dismiss and if
8	there are issues that they feel appropriate or
9	inappropriate to continue in the course of this
10	proceeding, then in our view testimony would be
11	appropriate on that.
12	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Are there any more
13	discussions on these points? Mr. Tucci, you're
14	finished?
15	MR. TUCCI: I think I'll rest. Thank you.
16	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Mr. Lutzker, are you
17	finished?
18	MR. LUTZKER: I'm done.
19	JUDGE CAMPBELL: All right. Why don't we
20	take a five minute break so you can prepare your file
21	of materials for argument.
22	(Whereupon, the foregoing matter went off

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the record at 5:07 p.m. and went back on 1 the record at 5:10 p.m.) 2 Move on to number 20, JUDGE CAMPBELL: 3 Independent Producer Group motion to dismiss claims 4 and related materials available and ready. 5 MR. LUTZKER: Readv. 6 7 JUDGE CAMPBELL: And we're speaking -since we've had so many documents, we are speaking to 8 9 this motion that was received by the Copyright Office on November 20, 2000. 10 Mr. Lutzker, you filed it. You may begin. 11 12 MR. LUTZKER: Thank you. Again, as I sort of acknowledged before, the documents in all these 13 14 motions are sort of extensively briefed. So, I will 15 try to just hit what are really the high points of our 16 concerns. 17 The Copyright Office had the opportunity in its June decisions to address questions regarding 18 the status of parties in this proceeding. And it made 19 20 sort of one comment during the course of its ruling 21 that who represents whom when is an important issue in 22 this case. It often is not a question brought up before the Copyright Office or the panel, but this is an issue, and clearly we've spent the last hour and a half sort of focusing on when did agreements get signed with respect to IPG, and in fairness we are not alone in the world in having some issues with respect to the status of claims.

Now, as you know, the MPAA is not a claimant at all in this proceeding. It represents Parties have to file their claims, then claimants. they have to agree to be represented by the MPAA, and MPAA has to present their case. And that's the essence of the way they do things. With respect to proceeding, there peculiarity was a occurred. The claimants filed their claims. The Copyright Office -- they filed their claims in July of 198. The Copyright Office announces in the summer of '99, a year or so later, that a Notice of Intent to Participate in a proceeding involving the 1997 royalties must be filed by a certain date, and the MPAA has been, as its experience, goes ahead and files that Notice of Intent to Participate.

It then turns out that they filed their

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direct case in this proceeding on April 3. During the course of the proceeding, their direct case, they indicated they represent 113 claimants and that they had executed agreements with 113 claimants. Now, as is our right in the course of discovery, we seek copies of agreements. Many of them, in fact, as a general matter, there was a resistance to provide us signed representation agreements, but eventually we got all the agreements that were entitled to. We didn't get them early; we got them late. It doesn't matter. We got them.

In looking at those agreements, we had the opportunity to reflect on another situation that developed. The situation that developed was that two agreements that we had asked for -- and really only two agreements were provided early on in discovery. Those are the agreements of Lacey and General Mills. Those agreements were provided very specifically in to specific potential disputes response to ownership of programming. And we asked for them, and low and behold they provided us copies of the signed Those were the only agreements that we agreements.

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were provided with signatures. We received an agreement in blank and that was it.

Now, looking at those two agreements, one things was peculiar. The peculiarity was that the Notice of Intent to Participate in this proceeding had to be filed, under the Copyright Office's rules, last fall. And the agreements, these two agreements were executed after the filing of the Notice of Intent to Participate was made. It struck us -- and the Notice of Intent to Participate, as set out by the Copyright Office regulations or Federal Register Notice and consistent with regulations, is that all claimants come forward. You file your Notice of Intent to Participate. If you don't file your Notice of Intent to Participate, you're out. You've either -- even though you filed a claim, your claim doesn't necessarily have to be heard if you're not timely in connection with this.

Seeing that these agreements were executed after this filing date, we began a process of raising before the Copyright Office a decision as to whether or not MPAA represented these two entities, and these

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are the only two that we knew about at that point in time, in a timely manner. And we said -- I mean, your order said file or else you're out. They didn't even represent them by signed agreements. Should they remain a party?

The Copyright Office, in its order issued on June 22, said this is a deviation from our rules, and what we're going to do is we're going to allow the claimants represented by MPAA to come forth and make their case for a waiver. We've done this in the past, and there are reasons that they felt supported that.

MPAA filed a petition for -- filed a motion for late acceptance -- motion for acceptance of a late file

Notice to Participate. And that was done on June 30.

In that document, MPAA dropped a footnote, footnote number one on page 1. It said, "We have looked through our agreements and low and behold one of the 113 claimants that we represent, Gaumont SA, we don't have an agreement for." And they say, "We had a standard that we would have agreements executed as a matter of our internal policy" -- I don't know if this is exactly correct, but essentially the point

they were making is, "Before we file our direct case, we'll have agreements with everybody. And Gaumont we don't have an agreement with, so we are relinquishing Gaumont's case," and they dropped a footnote to that effect. Okay.

And then they filed -- they didn't file sort of independent claims describing contracts that were executed between individual companies and MPAA. They filed a blanket claim on behalf of everybody; they laid out their case, and they basically, reading that document, one would conclude Gaumont is the only one that had a problem.

Then over the course of the next two or three months, we're doing our litigating thing, and we eventually receive copies of the signed executed agreements. And we had been entitled under compulsion order of the Copyright Office to receive all the documents.

In looking at the documents, a couple of things came to the fore, which were really addressed in this motion. First and foremost, Gaumont wasn't the only one that didn't have a signed agreement. It

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turned out of the material that we received, four companies did not receive -- did not deliver signed agreements -- or MPAA didn't deliver signed agreements. And we said what's good for Gaumont is good for the others. If you don't represent them -- if you don't represent Gaumont, you have no basis to represent these companies.

Subsequent to the filing of this motion, we were delivered last week -- I think it was last week; November 28, whenever that is -- the executed agreements with Jeopardy and American First run. And we accepted -- you know, there's a lot of paper that gets transferred back and forth, and mistakes happen. They had it. So, as far as those two companies are concerned we withdraw our concern, because they have the documents.

Okay. Atlantis Communications and Big Ticket, however, we don't have any documents for. Now, the opposition to our motion comes up with a series of explanations for this. And my reaction to the documentation as presented in our reply is as follows: As far as Big Ticket and Atlantis is

concerned, there are not representation agreements, and there's no basis upon which they can say that those entities as such are represented in this proceeding. Like Gaumont, their claims must be dismissed.

It may turn out, and I would presume under the circumstances that they will offer in testimony, that if it is true -- and there's no evidence to this arqumentation; there's no documentation on this point -- if it is true that there has been a transfer of ownership and the line of ownership remains legitimate, a third party may succeed to those particular interests. And it may be that a claim can be amended or clarified by later testimony with that respect to that. But fundamentally Big Ticket and Atlantis Communications have no independent basis in this case.

And as you can see, we can get into the nuances and particularities of how people are represented, the nature of claims, the ownership interests that are transferred. And we're not in a position to say they are they are not. Those rights

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are not held by somebody else. A claim was filed. If the party was sold and the business was created, I mean, we have sort of illusions to this in the papers, but that's not a basis to say this party has signed an agreement and is entitled to be a claimant.

The waiver request that was filed in June, and there was a reply to that waiver request, never alluded to anybody not signing an agreement. There was -- the direct case indicates that there -- everybody executed agreements for representation purposes. The attachment to the -- the amended attachment, which eliminates Gaumont in the waiver request, does not eliminate any other party.

In our view, it's a pretty straightforward case. They may or may not have a basis to come back with respect to particular programs, but as far as the claimants are concerned, these are entities that are not represented by MPAA, and they can't be -- they are not part of the MPAA case. And we ask you to so find.

Then with respect to the remaining documents that we've had an opportunity to visit with after they were sort of compelled and provided in

discovery, there were certain other anomalies that were presented. And the next section of our original motion sort of addresses the anomalies, and I will acknowledge that some of these anomalies may be addressable by fax that can be presented, but there are certain core questions that go to the legal sufficiency of the documents themselves that may require -- in our view requires a ruling by the panel.

When the Copyright Office issued ruling with respect to the documentation that was to be provided by MPAA in connection with this, as I said, on June 28, the Copyright Office's order -ruling on our request for certain documentation with respect to these claimants says specifically, the copyright entitled represents owners to distributions of the '97 syndicated program royalties and when they were represented is very much in issue in this proceeding." That's the Copyright Office's They acknowledge that the program suppliers assert that the 113 parties are identified, that they represent them, and this is a factual assertion.

Consequently, the program suppliers must

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produce, this is our compulsion order, the signed and dated copies of the representation agreements between program suppliers and each of the Exhibit 1 parties.

Now, our issues in the second part go to has the MPAA produced signed and dated representation agreements with each of the 113 parties?

With respect to several of these parties, we see critical problems. In one case, with respect to -- in actually two cases, Cinetel and Major League Baseball Properties, the signatures of the represented claimants are undated. Now, the form itself requires a dating, but the signatures themselves are undated. In our view, this raises an issue as to the timeliness of that signature.

Now, this was -- the critical thing from our perspective is not that they're undated. The critical thing is when the waiver request was made in June of this year and the MPAA had all these documents in its sole possession and IPG was asking for access to these documents and it was being denied access at that point in time, the MPAA, when it had the sole possession of the documents, failed to disclose

material issues or issues that could be material to 1 the Copyright Office in making its judgment on the 2 3 waiver. As a result of that, the Copyright Office 4 never had the opportunity to clarify do we mean signed 5 and dated by one party or the other? IPG did not have 6 7 the opportunity to argue that issue, and as a result 8 the issue has enough ambiguity that we think goes to 9 the heart of were these representation agreements signed and when were they signed? And there's an open 10 issue with respect to Cinetel and with respect to 11 Major League Baseball Properties. 12 On that issue --13 JUDGE COOLEY: MR. LUTZKER: Sure. 14 15 JUDGE COOLEY: -- should there be a 16 difference in our mind, as arbitrators, as to the requirements that are placed on you with regard to 17 18 representation agreements vis-a-vis the your representation agreements that are on this side of the 19 20 room? 21 MR. LUTZKER: Here's where I would draw 22 the distinction: Our burden -- we filed a timely claim, but we didn't have the joint statement. The Copyright Office, to validate that, wants to assure that the representation existed in July of '98 to satisfy its definition of a joint claim. We said we filed a joint claim, and we didn't include the paperwork that showed it. They wanted to verify that.

In this case, there is a regulation that requires entities to come forth and notice their intention to participate in a proceeding. It's critical, because if you don't come forth, your claim, even though you filed a timely claim, is gone.

So, there is a close analogy, I believe, between the nature of -- that's why the Copyright Office said, and they said it in the context of IPG's motion with regard to the timeliness of the signatures of Lacey and General Mills with respect to the MPAA contracts, when the agreements were reached is an issue that the Copyright Office felt was relevant with respect to theirs. And, so it obviously was relevant with respect to ours, because they wanted us to prove that we had the relationship existing by a certain date, and they had to prove that they had a

relationship existing by a certain date.

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What was that date? That date was, for purposes of their waiver, the filing of the direct case. If they had agreements -- that's why I say with respect to Jeopardy and American Studios, they presented documents that showed that they had the agreement prior to the filing of the direct case, and we withdraw our objection.

With respect to these parties, they don't prove that they've had that relationship existing at the time, because the claimant has not signed. If the claimant doesn't sign -- I take that back, the Claimant has signed but hasn't dated. So, the issue is not with regard to the signature but with regard to the dating. And the Copyright Office felt that the dating was a critical point with respect to these agreements. So, the issue is relevant to both.

In addition, as has been laid out numerous times in the course of the discovery request, there is no correspondence, there is no additional documentation, because we've asked for it. Give us correspondence with the claimants. Give us, you know,

cover letters or -- we have no documentation to support and they have no documentation to support the date of signing. So, we're left with an undated -- a document that's signed but undated.

In connection with the next three -- the Alliance International, All American Goodson, and All American Television -- we have another anomaly. The anomaly here is the documents are dated by MPAA after the date of the filing of the direct case. To us that's a -- it's an anomaly, and it raises a number of questions. There's again no documentation to clarify the anomaly. Clearly, the documents on their face are dated prior to the filing of the direct case. However, were they received by the MPAA prior to the direct case, because they are -- they could have been signed in February. They could have been put aside by somebody.

It's not necessarily clear from the document why it would be signed after the filing of the direct case. But importantly, the direct case says we have executed agreements with everybody, and they sign -- every agreement, every other agreement

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that they claim is valid is signed by both parties and dated by both parties. So, where you have an anomaly like this it does raise a legitimate concern that there may be an issue as to the actual receipt dating in relation to the filing of the direct case.

There are three additional agreements that we've also identified, and again the additional anomalies, in one case it is unsigned by the MPAA, signed by a claimant but unsigned by the MPAA. that meet the Copyright Office's requirement of June In another case, it is signed and dated by the 28? claimant but merely signed and not dated by the MPAA. And in the third case, and I will admit I'm working off of presumably a xerox copy, but my looking at the copy leads me to believe the date is sometime a year too early, which raises a question. I mean, there may be a mistake. If it can be clarified, so be it. there clearly seems a disjointer, because it appears to be dated a year before it was sent, which I don't have to explain, but I think I just point that out as an anomaly.

The third set of issues --

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1	JUDGE CAMPBELL: I have a quick question.
2	MR. LUTZKER: Sure.
3	JUDGE CAMPBELL: How would you know when
4	it was sent?
5	MR. LUTZKER: In the discovery material,
6	we obtained documents that place and I'm going on
7	memory now I believe it's October 20, 19 or 20, of
8	1998, and there's a memorandum from Ms. Kessler to
9	claimants indicating the here's our representation
10	agreement, and so that was the date that I was using
11	on that basis.
12	JUDGE DAVIS: Excuse me
13	MR. LUTZKER: I'm sorry, it was October of
14	'99. October 20, 1999 was the date that the
15	memorandum was sent out. The CPT document appears to
16	be dated in '98.
17	JÜDGE DAVIS: I just wanted to get that
18	straight, that CPT in that was Exhibit Number 9.
19	MR. LUTZKER: Right.
20	JUDGE DAVIS: Okay. Thank you.
21	MR. LUTZKER: Okay. Now, the and
22	again, I'm just reading what I'm reading. The last

two issues -- or the last actually it's three entities for which we raise an issue goes to this very question And we feel in the sense that a of joint claims. spotlight has been turned on IPG for its involvement with WSG's claim. It is not inappropriate for the panel to look at other parties that filed in terms of a joint claim or in terms of representations that they make a joint claim and whether or not they meet the Copyright Office requirements. And it may be that the panel will decide that what's appropriate for IPG is also appropriate for these entities based upon the order. That's why I said they may have other applicability.

But because the issue had not been addressed before, and I just again raise the point that the claims of overview productions and also two separate claims, one by PGA Tours and then also by PGA, speak in terms of joint entities that they are representing. There's a letter attached to the overview which suggests that they are speaking as a joint claimant, as a copyright owner, and as a licensed distributer. They have not clarified in that

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letter whether or not the nature of their licensing is exclusive or non-exclusive. They don't identify any other parties. And, so it does raise, in our view, ambiguities that have been addressed at us, and we think, again, it is not inappropriate -- if you're going to take scrutiny at what we do and we've presented additional documentation, this has some of the same flavor.

The issue with regard to the PGA speaks in terms of filing on behalf of itself and all of its In the opposition it was stated, "Well, membership. this doesn't require entities to file names of This is not a joint claim." However, if you members. look at, as we did in our reply, and make specific reference to a number of other claims filed and represented by the MPAA, there are many people that do speak of a joint claim on behalf of membership and attach of list on behalf of their members of all their listed members. And included in that are the National Basketball Association, the Audio-Visual Copyright Society, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, and NHL Enterprises. In each case they say we're filing

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on our behalf and the behalf of its members. Attached 1 is a list of the members. 2 JUDGE CAMPBELL: But, Mr. Lutzker, doesn't 3 4 a non-profit organization always speak on behalf of its members? They don't have stockholders. 5 And it 6 would seem that they are the ones who would receive 7 the royalties. And my understanding is PGA Tour, Inc. is a not for profit. So, do you have a response to 8 9 that? I just need to know where you're going with this. 10 Well, my interpretation of 11 MR. LUTZKER: 12 on behalf of its members are that it is not a stock 13 corporation, but when it speaks of members it does 14 speak of third parties. It is identified -- it could 15 have said, "We're filing on our behalf," in which case 16 I don't think the issue would have necessarily been 17 addressed. They chose to style this filing on behalf 18 of our members. It's because a non-profit is not a 19 stock corporation it has a listing of entities that 20 are entitled to share in these proceeds. 21 JUDGE CAMPBELL: Well, perhaps --

Okay.

MR. LUTZKER:

1	JUDGE CAMPBELL: depending on what the
2	membership
3	MR. LUTZKER: Yes. Depending yes, I
4	mean
5	JUDGE CAMPBELL: So, maybe we can get some
6	clarification.
7	MR. LUTZKER: The nature of the membership
8	is not clear on its face. And in terms of the
9	analogies, as I said, when others have used the
LO	phrase, they have listed this and I suspect this
L1	Copyright Society, there may be others. I don't know
L2	if the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation I don't
L3	know whether its legal status is that of a I mean,
L4	there's a governmental component to it, whether it's
L5	it may not be viewed as a for-profit corporation.
L6	I don't know.
L7	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Well, let's take a look
L8	at your Exhibit 10 we were talking about, the overview
L9	productions, because there are two items there.
20	You've been kind to put them both in. The July 22,
21	1998 letter indicates that overview that the claim

affidavits were submitted in joint capacity to cover

properties where overview is not the sole copyright owner. And since we're dealing with United States copyright law, a co-owner is like a partner and is allowed to receive royalties and exploit the copyright without even talking to the other co-owner as long as the royalties are paid. So, do you still feel that that is a joint claim, because I'm afraid that a lot of our owners, if you looked at the different copyright owners, would probably be joint owners. And that seems to me splitting hairs, but I want to hear what you have to say.

MR. LUTZKER: Well, I think the issue is -- what they say here is they may be -- where they're not the sole copyright owner but rather maybe either only a co-owner, in which case I would agree, a co-owner would be an owner, or a licensed distributor that is authorized to file here. That's the phrase that gives me some concern. An exclusive licensee for purposes of filing a claim without a status, in our view, is a claimant. A non-exclusive licensee may not. I don't know if this issue has been presented before to the Copyright Office or to the CARP. I know

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that there are -- I mean, if you look at under the Copyright Act under section -- under the remedies provisions, a non-exclusive licensee is limited in terms of the remedies. Or put it like this: The remedies that are available are available to an owner or an exclusive licensee of copyrighted property. They are not available to a non-exclusive licensee.

and I don't know the nature of the third parties that they may be licensing and the nature of those relationships. If they are exclusive -- and again MPAA has no documentation that they can proffer at this point, because we've asked for all the documents, correspondence, and information that they have from the claimant.

Now, it does pose, to me, an issue of proper status of a claimant. And if they were simply applying -- and I think in the response is an issue whether or not this is an individual claim and a joint claim. I mean that may be without trying to split hairs, I would not find a problem. It would require perhaps a waiver, an amendment of copyright office

regulations that I think since it hasn't been ruled on before you can probably resolve as to whether or not how you characterize this claim as an individual claim or as a joint claim. But if it's an individual claim, then they would have a burden of proof with respect to each of the programs that are assigned to them and what is their relationship.

Are they the owner or co-owner of those programs? Those are fine. If they are licensed from the third party, if they're an exclusive licensee, they would also be able to claim those. If they're non-exclusive licensee, that is the area where we have an issue. So, if they are a joint claimant, it is appropriate to list the parties where they have a non-exclusive relationship with, and then they would satisfy the requirements of the copyright laws.

JUDGE CAMPBELL: Unless, of course, a non-exclusive relationship included language that allowed that non-exclusive licensee to file.

MR. LUTZKER: Well, here's where -- that sounds a lot like the problem that we've got, that IPG has. All of IPG's agreements are arrangements with

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claimants that say, "IPG you have exclusive right to

-- in this case exclusive right. You are going to

collect that money." And then based on their

agreement, they figure out how to divvy it up. But

there is a transfer of rights of collecting the

royalties. And IPG thought that was enough to qualify

them to make a claim on behalf of the parties with

whom they had the agreement. And the Copyright Office

said no. I don't necessarily agree with it, but for

present purposes that's the law, okay?

IPG's contracts that says, "IPG, you're the one to go after these royalties exclusively. We're not going to do it. We own the property. We're not going to do it. You're going to do it." That does not transfer the interest sufficient to satisfy the requirements, and what they had to do was mention the parties with whom they had the agreements.

And, so in this case, by saying we're a joint claimant, by saying they're a joint claimant because they own things, whether they own it outright or co-own it, they own it, and they're a claimant. Where they're licensed, they either have the right

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sufficient to be a party here as an exclusive licensee or they should identify the parties. That's our position.

Thank you. Mr. Tucci? JUDGE CAMPBELL: Thank you. MR. TUCCI: We view this motion as a discussion of the reddest of red herrings. This is just a blatant effort to lump together the motion that we just spent the last three hours talking about and apply that criteria established copyright order to the representation agreements that exist with respect to the program suppliers. The problem with doing that is there's no statute that requires it, there's no regulation that requires it, and there's no order of the Copyright Office that As a matter of fact, the program requires it. suppliers could have oral representation agreements with each and every one of their represented parties. There is absolutely nothing that requires a written representation here. There is an order of Copyright Office that requires us to produced written representation agreements if they exist, obviously, and that's what we've done. It's a matter of practice

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that the MPAA requires written agreements. It is not by regulation, it is not by statute, it is not by order. Everything that Mr. Lutzker just talked about is ripe for cross examination of the MPAA program supplier's representative, but that's all it is. It all goes to the weight that you want to give the evidence that will be before you.

We have asserted in the direct testimony that we represent these parties. We have asserted, and it's been accepted by the Copyright Office, that each and every one of them filed a valid claim. We have asserted a Notice of Intent to Participate in this on behalf of each and every one of those parties, and that has been accepted by the Copyright Office. There's a prima facie case right there. There is absolutely no reason that any of these relationships are subject to being dismissed at this time.

It's all a matter of proof. It's all a matter of whether or not Mr. Lutzker and his client can cast sufficient doubt on our factual assertion of representation; that's it. And the evidence before you will show things like we have represented a

particular party for ten or 15 years. The evidence will also show that that party filed a claim. The evidence will show that that party is not claiming it's represented by any other party. I mean, it's going to be very difficult to cast aspersions and cast doubt on the factual assertion that the MPAA, the program suppliers represent these entities.

JUDGE COOLEY: You said each claimant has filed a claim, but is it a timely filed claim?

MR. TUCCI: Absolutely, absolutely. Every one has filed a timely claim. And as a matter of fact, even if we talk about the alleged joint claims, and I think some of the problems with the assertions of IPG were noted, those claims were not attacked on a timely basis by IPG. They're timely filed claims. There was a deadline imposed by the Copyright Office for attacking the validity of claims, and none of them were attacked. They're in this case.

And I think if you look at them in and of themselves, the actual facts of them speak volumes. The overview is not a joint claim by any stretch of the imagination. PGA, PGA Tour, I think we've hit on

the inability to give you any reason to dismiss those 1 claims on this basis. 2 But, again, this is only an issue of 3 It's an issue of whether we have made a 4 proof. factual assertion sufficient to make out a prima facie 5 6 case whether their argument defeats 7 assertion. And it doesn't, because as I stated, there 8 is no requirement that we have a written agreement; 9 there's no requirement we have a signed agreement; there's no requirement we have a dated agreement. 10 11 have made the factual assertion that we represent this 1.2 client. If we have an agreement, you're right, we have to produce it, and we did. 1.3 And, so then it's your JUDGE COOLEY: 14 15 position that you can introduce testimony in the 16 hearing on these points if we raise them. 17 MR. TUCCI: Absolutely, absolutely. 18 if there's a question that needs to be clarified, it 19 can be clarified at that point in time. Thank you. 20 JUDGE CAMPBELL: Mr. Lutzker, a response 21 perhaps? 22 MR. LUTZKER: Yes. I mean just briefly.

There was a requirement. The Copyright Office, in its Notice of Intent to Participate, told the world, "Claimants, if you want to participate come forth. Tell us on a certain date that you are in this proceeding." The notice further says if you don't -- if you are a claimant and you don't file a Notice of Intent to Participate, you're out. Clear, okay?

Motion Picture Association files the claim. It is not a claimant. At the time it's filing a claim, it doesn't represent -- it doesn't have a signed agreement with anybody for 1997.

One of the earlier documents that we presented sort of broke out the litany of how many claimants are from year to year the same, and there are -- and I don't remember the number off the top of my head -- but there are dozens of new claimants in 1997. Thirty-three percent approximately -- I think it was actually 37 or 38 percent of the claimants in 1997 never participated in a prior proceeding. There is no basis for a presumption of long-standing relationships. There's no basis for a presumption that these entities will sign agreements with the

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Be that as it may, this is not an issue that normally has been litigated before, has been addressed, so okay. It gets raised. The Copyright Office says, "Oh, this is an issue." They didn't say, "We accept the MPA position on this." They said, "We're going to require the MPA to file a waiver request, " which they did. They filed it on June 30. And in that waiver request -- I didn't write the waiver request; they wrote the waiver request -- they said, "We don't have a deal with Gaumont. We couldn't find it. We filed on April 3. They're out." I didn't say it. They said it. said it. They must know something. They're intelligent, right? They're out.

Now, we've got two others that don't have an agreement, and they want to say they're in because we can have oral understandings. And the answer is they can't be in. You can't have it both ways. I'm not imposing these requirements. This is their own statement. They said, "We have written deals. We have agreements. We went through" -- read their

motion for a waiver filed June 30 -- "We went through these and we're verifying, and here's an attachment of 113 parties with whom we have agreements." And it turns out two days before, so they had time, and even if they had it in draft and they didn't have time to really think about it, they had the opportunity for reply later in July so they could have thought about this.

The Copyright Office in ruling on our motion to dismiss, or it might have been actually motion for compulsion of documents, said who represents them and when they represent them are important issues in this proceeding. So, to say that there are not rulings, the notice requirement sets it out clearly with respect to all the claimants.

And this isn't an issue that is necessarily one that could be addressed in testimony. we've already -- they've acknowledged mean, repeatedly they don't have documents. Now, maybe witnesses can recall dates that things were received one by one by one. That may be the case, but they could have presented testimonial evidence by way of

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affidavit to explain defects. They didn't 1 They left it for us to discover months 2 after the fact, months after the fact because we 3 4 didn't have access to discovery of these documents until, my recollection is, September 28. Months after 5 6 the fact when we first get to review the documents, we 7 finally have an opportunity to assess that. So, I mean, from our point of view, the 8 9 issues that are raised are cogent, legitimate, and to the extent there's some novelty with respect to them, 10

JUDGE CAMPBELL: There's a question here.

JUDGE DAVIS: With the danger of this turning into a roundtable on copyright, let me repeat your argument as I understand it, and feel free to stop me. The right to exploit the copyright and claim the royalties is a right exclusive to the copyright holder. Just like an assignment of the copyright itself, the assignment of an exclusive right must be in writing. Is that your argument?

I beg your pardon. But some of them seem pretty clear

MR. LUTZKER: The assignment of an

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to me.

1	exclusive right should be in writing, yes.
2	JUDGE DAVIS: And what you're saying for
3	Atlantis and Big Ticket in particular is that there
4	are no writings.
5	MR. LUTZKER: Correct.
6	JUDGE DAVIS: And some of these others
7	arguments you say that even though there is a writing
8	it is deficient because of dating and signing and
9	things like that.
LO	Now, Mr. Tucci, you get to talk about this
L1	too. Feel free.
L2	MR. TUCCI: It's not an assignment of
L3	copyright. We are representing the interest of the
L4	copyright holder in front of this panel to collect and
L5	administer the royalty payment, and we turn around and
L6	cut a check back to the owner. That's it.
L7	JUDGE DAVIS: I understand it's not an
L8	assignment of copyright
L9	MR. TUCCI: It's not an assignment, so
20	JUDGE DAVIS: It's an assignment of an
21	exclusive right held by a copyright holder.
22	MR. TUCCI: It's a statutory and

regulatory manner in which to distribute copyright royalties administered by the Copyright Office. That's what it is.

JUDGE CAMPBELL: So, what --

MR. TUCCI: It's not an assignment to collect a copyright. I mean, we are participating in a regulatory and statutory scheme, which says that we can band together and represent interests of several holders. It does not say it has to be pursuant to writing. It doesn't say it has to be pursuant to a dated agreement.

JUDGE DAVIS: But it does have to be --

MR. TUCCI: And the practice in the past has been that none of this has been required. This is the first proceeding in which the Copyright Office has actually required the program suppliers to produced representation agreements. We have always in the past produced a blank representation agreement which sufficed as the form representation agreement, because quite frankly they're all the same. What happened this time is in this proceeding, based on the objection of IPG, and the reason you get the signed

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1	and dated language is because we had already produced
2	this blank form. And, so the Copyright Office said,
3	"No, this time we're going to make you do signed and
4	dated ones, not just a blank form." So, I just want
5	to make sure that that was cleared up and not an issue
6	in your mind.
7	JUDGE DAVIS: Okay. Well, I'm sure we'll
8	come again on this oh, feel free.
9	MR. LUTZKER: I mean, I think where I was
10	coming from on your question related to the extent
11	represented claimants are exclusive licensees
12	JUDGE DAVIS: Yes?
13	MR. LUTZKER: There would be a writing
14	with respect to that. I don't disagree with the
15	principle that in other context there may be oral
16	understandings between parties. I think we both have
17	argued this at various points in our pleading, that
18	you can have an oral representation agreement, and I
19	would agree with that.
20	However, in this particular case, in this
21	particular proceeding, the Copyright Office has made

two independent rulings, one that applies to us and

one that applies to MPAA. In our case they said, "We want to see written documents, because to preserve the integrity of the scheme, that people don't come in late and sort of lob on, climb on to a preexisting claim because you haven't sort of identified joint claimants. You've got to have some clarify, and so you've got to produce something in writing that's tangible that we can see rather than just oral testimony, and I talked to somebody on the phone, and they said it's okay."

In their case, in their case, because they failed to have executed agreements or even oral agreements. They don't allege oral agreements with parties prior to the filing of the Notice of Intent to Participate. When they filed their direct case, they say they have executed disagreements -- turns out they did and they didn't -- but at the time of filing of the Notice of Intent to Participate, they didn't have executed agreements with anybody. Therefore, in exercising its judgment, the Copyright Office says, "Okay, MPAA, come in for a waiver, but we're going to hold you to producing the signed and dated copies of

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1	these agreements by the MPAA program suppliers and the
2	parties, signed and dated by both entities."
3	And, so our position is as regards these
4	particular representation agreements, they should be
5	signed and dated by both parties.
6	JUDGE DAVIS: I understand your position.
7	MR. TUCCI: May I very briefly address one
8	point?
9	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Yes.
10	MR. TUCCI: It will be very brief. I just
11	want to address the point of the two claimants that
12	IPG would have you dismiss. They're both valid
13	claims. They filed claims. And the other point that
14	you need to be aware of is they were acquired by other
15	claimants. So, the claim is still there. It's just
16	being pursued it survives. It's being pursued by
17	another MPAA program supplier party.
18	JUDGE DAVIS: And, excuse me, these are
19	Atlantis and Big Ticket?
20	MR. TUCCI: Yes.
21	JUDGE CAMPBELL: And they were acquired by
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MR. TUCCI: Atlantis was combined with
Alliance, and Alliance is a program supplier. Big
Ticket was acquired by World Vision, which was
acquired by Paramount. So, it actually has had a
three-step process. And this has all occurred after
the filing of claims and around the time of the filing
of our testimony. So, we represent 113 parties here,
and to place on us the burden of immediately filing
something with the Copyright Office the moment one of
our represented parties engages in a transaction or
else the claim is dismissed is rather draconian.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: So, Atlantis is now part
of Alliance
MR. TUCCI: Alliance.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: which has already
filed its claim.
MR. TUCCI: Right.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: And for the record, Big
Ticket Television is part of what was World Vision,
and that has been acquired by Paramount
MR. TUCCI: Paramount, correct.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: also a claimant.

1	MR. TUCCI: Correct.
2	JUDGE CAMPBELL: I have a question before
3	you do.
4	JUDGE DAVIS: Go ahead, you're entitled.
5	JUDGE CAMPBELL: World Vision was a
6	claimant.
7	MR. TUCCI: I think that's right as well,
8	yes. So, actually, the numbers have gone
9	JUDGE CAMPBELL: So, the numbers have gone
10	down again, because that acquisition of sorts or
11	whatever has drawn these into the same pot.
12	MR. TUCCI: Correct.
13	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Just trying to get
14	clarification here.
15	MR. TUCCI: Correct.
16	JUDGE DAVIS: The same for Alliance too?
17	MR. TUCCI: Alliance is still a claimant,
18	yes. They're in their own right.
19	JUDGE CAMPBELL: Today.
20	MR. TUCCI: Alliance is still a claimant
21	today.
22	MS. KESSLER: Yes, they filed their owr

claim. 1 JUDGE DAVIS: Thank you. Excuse me, could 2 you identify yourself for the record? 3 4 MS. **KESSLER:** I'm sorry, I'm Marcia Kessler, Vice President of Retransmission Royalty 5 6 Distribution, MPAA. 7 Thank you. JUDGE DAVIS: JUDGE CAMPBELL: Now, Mr. Lutzker. 8 All right. 9 MR. LUTZKER: Two little 10 things. I don't know what's happened with respect to 11 the programs owned by Big Ticket and Atlantis. 12 we do know is there are no signed agreements. The waiver at the end of June said, "Here's the 113 13 entities that we had signed agreements from." There's 14 15 no correspondence between MPAA and any of these 16 I don't know when the agreements were -- if 17 they were acquisitions, when they were acquired. 18 I have no trouble -- I'll say this for the 19 record -- I'll have no trouble, if they want to 20 present evidence at the hearing that Paramount or Viacom now 21 represents these particular programs

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formally owned by somebody, that's -- and they can

establish a chain of title, I have no problem with that. But that doesn't go to the issue of is Alliance or Big Ticket still a claimant represented by MPAA in this proceeding. That's the nub of the issue, because by failing to have any agreement with them, they can't be part of the group that executed representation agreements. They haven't. A successor company may have done that. Maybe the claimants assume, and that's something that we can explore.

And in the end, how much of a difference does it make? Well, it may make a difference, because sometimes companies sell programs different in They may own ten. I don't know how many directions. they own. Their claim only has to identify one. may own ten, and they may sell eight to one entity and two to another. Is that other entity there. If we don't deal now with the propriety of Big Ticket, it opens up --

JUDGE CAMPBELL: Questions.

MR. LUTZKER: -- questions that frankly I don't think we should have to deal with, because it's their burden, it's their group. They said they had

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executed agreements, and they don't. 1 JUDGE CAMPBELL: Mr. Lutzker has made a 2 3 recommendation that I feel is appropriate unless anybody else sees otherwise. Perhaps at the hearing 4 tomorrow or in January if you could provide some 5 clarification documentation. I don't think that's 6 7 unreasonable. I think it will make it more clear for 8 the Library at the end of these proceedings after the 9 180 days. If you want to do it by oral testimony or by notarized affidavit, sworn affidavit, I think 10 11 either one would be appropriate. 12 MR. TUCCI: We'll be happy to do that. 13 JUDGE CAMPBELL: Now, if there are no more 14 questions or assertions by anyone? It matters because 15 we don't want you to get assaulted by the police. 16 After six o'clock they didn't want anybody without a 17 pass to be in here. So, we will recess until tomorrow 18 at the appointed time in the schedule, which is I believe --19 20 JUDGE COOLEY: 9:30. 21 JUDGE CAMPBELL: Ιf 9:30? that's 22 satisfactory to everyone?

JUDGE COOLEY: And could we clarify what 1 motions are tomorrow? We know we have the third 2 motion and there were other unidentified motions. 3 JUDGE CAMPBELL: Right. We have on the 4 order recently filed about the schedule for these 5 hearings, I think we finished number one and number 6 7 two. We're on to number three. And then number four, outstanding motions, probably depending on how many we 8 complete. We've just received several today. 9 10 MR. TUCCI: I think there's two that have been filed. There's Mr. Lutzker's 11 motion 1.2 reconsider your November 15 order dismissing Lacey and General Mills. And there's our additional motion for 13 -- motion for additional discovery. 14 15 JUDGE COOLEY: Right. 16 MR. TUCCI: And we're prepared to talk 17 about actually, I think the motion for 18 reconsideration of your November 15 order we've 19 already probably hit every issue that's relevant. 20 JUDGE CAMPBELL: Do you feel that's 21 appropriate? Okay. And there is a pleading cycle, so 22 anyone who would be willing to do the oral argument

without a pleading cycle can speak up. But if they
want to go through a pleading cycle, that is available
to you. We're not going to hasten the proceedings if
someone feels that they want to follow a pleading
cycle.
Mr. Lutzker?
MR. LUTZKER: As you know, I've been away.
The documents were served today. I got in and sort of
hurriedly looked at them. I don't have a reaction yet
regarding this.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: Well, I think it's fair
to give you the time
MR. LUTZKER: I appreciate it.
JUDGE CAMPBELL: that is normally given
by
MR. LUTZKER: I mean, I may be prepared to
deal with our motion. I don't want to prejudge it,
because I've got to see what was really said. In
terms of the other I haven't even read the other
documents, because just getting over here
JUDGE CAMPBELL: Well, I think it would be
fair to all parties

JUDGE COOLEY: It's quite short. 1 I mean, maybe, you know --2 MR. LUTZKER: Why don't we do this: 3 JUDGE CAMPBELL: We'll proceed with the ones we know we're going to do. 4 If by the middle of the day, break tomorrow, either 5 one of you feel like you can both charge ahead and you 6 7 both agree and we have time, then we can reserve that 8 time for the motions that are recently filed. the other hand, either one of you feel that you need 9 extra time to complete the pleading cycle, that is 10 certainly appropriate. Is that satisfactory? 11 MR. TUCCI: That's fine. 12 13 MR. LUTZKER: Yes. JUDGE CAMPBELL: Anything else? Thank you 14 15 all for your participation today, and we will adjourn 16 until tomorrow morning at 9:30. We appreciate your extra efforts at answering all questions thoroughly 17 18 and being completely gracious about it all the way We will see you tomorrow. 19 Thank you. 20 (Whereupon, the conference recessed at 6:04 p.m. to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., December 12, 21 22 2000.)

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the foregoing transcript in

the matter of:

Oral Arguments:

Distribution of 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997 Cable Royalty Funds, Docket No. 2000-2 CARP CD 93-97

Before:

Library of Congress

Copyright Arbitration Royalty Panel

Date:

December 11, 2000

Place:

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